University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1980

Coercive Sentencing
Steven S. Nemerson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Nemerson, Steven S., "Coercive Sentencing" (1980). Minnesota Law Review. 2371.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2371

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Coercive Sentencing
Steven S. Nemerson*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .....................................
I1. COERCIVE SENTENCING PRACTICES ...........
A. DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCING AND
.................................
Acceptance of a Lesser Plea..................
Agreement Not to Prosecute ..................
Sentencing Recommendations................
Leniency Toward Others .....................

675
676
676
677
677

B. COERCED TESTIMONY AND UNDERCOVER WORK..
MAGNITUDE OF SENTENCING DIFFERENTIALS ......

678
680

ETHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COERCION ....
A. UTILIARAmSM ...................................
B. RETRIBUTION ......................................

681
683
688

C.

694

PLEA BARGAINING

1.
2.
3.
4.
C.

III.

670
675

PLUR

m.SM ........................................

D. PLURALISM AND COERCIVE SENTENCING ..........
IV. LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON DIFFERENTIAL
SENTENCING ........................................
A. DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCES THAT

698
701

701
1. Tests of Voluntariness ........................ 702
a. Truthfulness ............................... 702
"COERCE" CONFESSIONS ..........................

b. Informed Choice and Opportunity
For Reasoned Deliberation ...............
c. Absence of Governmental
Misconduct .................................

704
706

B. DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCES THAT UNDULY
BURDEN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ................

707

C. RECENT CASES: BORDENKIRCHER v.
HAYES AND CoRmIIT V. NEW JERSEY .............

713

* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I would like to thank my
colleagues David P. Bryden, Barry C. Feld, and Robert J. Levy for their detailed
and very helpful comments on drafts of this Article. I would also like to express my thanks for the generous research grant provided through the University of Minnesota Law School Partners in Excellence Program.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:669

V. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PLEA BARGAINING ......
A. ENSURING CERTAIN AND PROMPT
CORRECTIONAL MEASURES ........................
B. INDICATION OF GENUINE REMORSE ...............
C. ALLOWING FOR FLEXIBLE SENTENCING ...........
D. MAKING PUBLC TRIALS UNNECESSARY ...........

E.
F.

719
720
722
723
725

INDUCING COOPERATION IN THE
PROSECUTION OF OTHERS .........................

725

ADMINISTRATIVE NECESSITY ......................

725

VI. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COERCED
COOPERATION ...................................... 729
A.

ENHANCED SENTENCES AND THE FIFTH

AMENDMENT .......................................

B.

OTHER LIMITATIONS ON ENHANCED

C.

ACCEPTABILITY OF SENTENCING
CONCESSIONS .....................................

SENTENCES ........................................

731
733

737
VII. COERCIVE PRACTICES AND "PRESUMPTIVE"
SENTENCING ........................................ 738
VIII. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS .................. 740
IX. CONCLUSION ........................................ 750
I. INTRODUCTION
Coercion-the constraint of a voluntary moral agent by the
application of superior force, or by authority resting on forcewas long identified by the prevailing jurisprudential theories as
the fundamental element of all legal systems. A "noncoercive
law," or so it was argued, had the same ontological status as the
unicorn.'
Kelsen's view of the relationship between substantive law
and the exercise of official force captures the essence of that
positivist tradition:
One shall not steal; if somebody steals, he shall be punished. If it is
assumed that the first norm which forbids theft is valid only if the second norm attaches a sanction to the theft, then the first norm is certainly superfluous in an exact exposition of the law. If at all existent,
the first norm is contained in the second norm which is the only genuine norm .... Law is the primary norm which stipulates the sanc-

1. See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED
(1832); T. HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL AND PoLITIc (2d ed. F. Tonnies 1969); T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (A. Walter trans. 1904); H. KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF LAw AND STATE (A. Wedberg trans. 1945); H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY
OF LAw (M. Knight trans. 1967).
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Although the positivist conception of a legal system as
nothing more than a set of rules backed by threats of force has
been substantially discredited as inadequate,3 it did possess an
ineluctable element of truth, manifested most clearly in the
body of substantive criminal law and authorized penalties. The
coercive nature of the criminal sanction finds expression in the
traditionally enunciated goals of punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, and reform. Imposition of suffering furthers the
ends of the substantive law by physically restraining those
otherwise willing to violate prescribed norms, by offering a rational incentive to those same individuals, when otherwise
physically free to do so, to refrain from such violations, and by
altering the individual's psychological make-up to eliminate or
reduce the tendency to crime.
The validity of these goals of punishment has been, and
continues to be, widely discussed in the legal, sociological, and
philosophical literature. Despite the existence of significant
disputes, a general consensus has emerged that one or more
such ends, variously weighted, are appropriately considered in
determining the disposition of a criminal case. 4 Coercive uses
of the criminal sanction for purposes other than deterrence, incapacitation, and reform, however, have gone largely unexamined.
This Article will examine the exercise of the sentencing
power to induce criminal defendants to cooperate with the
state in ways not necessarily involving personal compliance
with legal prohibitions of conduct. Such cooperation takes four
broad forms: defendants fearing severity or hoping for leniency
may (1) plead guilty to criminal charges, forgoing trial and
waiving numerous trial-related constitutional rights; (2) testify
in the criminal prosecutions of others; (3) provide extrajudicial
information to government -agents investigating past or potential crimes; or (4) become undercover informants or operatives
2.

H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 61 (A. Wedberg trans.

1945).
3. See, e.g., L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY Or LAw (rev. ed. 1969); L HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
4. See, e.g., JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT (J. Cederblom & W. Blizek eds.
1977); J. KLEnIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT (1974); P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGiN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST
AND EFFECTIvE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1977);
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976) [hereinafter cited as FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT]; A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64.669

for law enforcement agencies. The legal, ethical, and practical
difficulties inherent in the exercise of the sentencing power to
achieve such ends are illustrated in an examination of what is
almost undoubtedly the best-known instance of the practiceJudge John Sirica's sentencing of the Watergate burglars.
On January 30, 1973, G. Gordon Liddy and James W. McCord, Jr., were convicted by a federal court jury on charges relating to the Watergate break-in.5 Despite the prosecution's
success, Judge Sirica believed that pertinent facts concerning
the break-in at the Democratic National Headquarters had remained undisclosed at trial.6 In an effort designed to bring
those facts to light, he postponed final sentencing pending completion of presentencing reports and encouraged the convicted
burglars to cooperate in the interim with the ongoing Watergate investigation.
McCord's response to Judge Sirica's tactics reveals both
the effectiveness of coercive sentencing and some of its troubling implications. McCord wrote to Sirica:
Certain questions have been posed to me from your honor through
the probation officer, dealing with details of the case, motivations, intent and mitigating circumstances.
In endeavoring to respond to these questions, I am whipsawed in a
variety of legalities. First, I may be called before a Senate Committee
investigating this matter. Secondly, I may be involved in a civil suit.
and thirdly, there may be a new trial at some future date. Fourthly, the
probation officer may be called before the Senate Committee to present testimony regarding what may otherwise be a privileged communication between defendant and Judge, as I understand it; if I answered
certain questions to the probation officer, it is possible such answers
could become a matter of record in the Senate and therefore available
for use in the other proceedings just described. My answers would, it
would seem to me, to [sic] violate my Fifth Amendment rights, and
possibly my Sixth Amendment right to counsel and possibly other
rights.
On the other hand, to fail to answer your questions may appear to
be non-cooperation, and I can therefore expect a much more severe
sentence.
There are further considerations which are not to be lightly taken.
Several members of my family have expressed fear for my life if I disclose knowledge of the facts in this matter, either publicly or to any
government representative. Whereas I do not share their concerns to
the same degree, nevertheless, I do believe that retaliatory measures
will be taken against me, my family, and my friends should I disclose
such facts. Such retaliation could destroy careers, incomes, and repu7
tations of persons who are innocent of any guilt whatever.
5. See J. SmicA, To SET THE RECORD SmAIcr 84-90 (1979).
6. See id. at 88.
7. United States v. Liddy, 397 F. Supp. 947, 951 app. (D.D.C. 1975) (quoting
Letter from James W. McCord to Judge Sirica (Mar. 19, 1973)).
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Despite such fears, McCord made allegations and offered to
provide in camera information that played a substantial part in
producing the dramatic results of the Watergate investigation.8
Having cooperated, McCord was sentenced to one to five
years in prison, a sentence that was subsequently reduced.9 In
contrast, G. Gordon Liddy, who had refused to cooperate in the
investigation, was given a sentence of six years and eight
months to twenty years, and fined $40,000.10 Judge Sirica emphasized the coercive purpose of these sentences when he denied Liddy's motion for a reduction of sentence:
Subsequent to his conviction and sentencing in this case, the defendant had several opportunities to provide valuable assistance to
governmental investigating units by testifying as to his knowledge of
certain alleged illegal activities. He was even granted immunity from
prosecution for the testimony which he was subpoenaed to give. Yet,
he refused to cooperate. It is reasonable for the Court to assume that
this defendant had reason to know and believe that any further consideration he might receive from the Court concerning his sentence might
be affected by his conduct after sentencing. In fact he was present in
the courtroom when his co-defendants were specifically informed that
their cooperation with the grand jury and Senate Select Committee
would be a relevant factor which the Court would consider in determining their final sentences.
Yet, despite this admonition by the Court and the fact that the
Court subsequently gave consideration to other defendants on this basis, this defendant chose to continue to refuse to cooperate with the
government investigations.
In short, this defendant has not shown the Court the slightest remorse or regret for his actions, and has not given the Court even a hint
of contrition or sorrow, nor has he made any attempt to compensate for
his illegal actions by trying to aid our system of justice in its search for
the truth.1 1

Other judges, engaging in similar practices in less publicized cases, have expressed deeper concern for the propriety of
their actions. In a case involving charges of conspiracy and
civil rights violations against officers of New York City's special
antinarcotics unit, United States District Judge Jack B. Weinstein, after discussing the coercive sentencing scheme he had
8. See J. SmIcA, supra note 5, at 96.
9. Id. at 120.
10. Id. at 118.
11. United States v. Liddy, 397 F. Supp. 947, 948-49 (D.D.C. 1975).
12. Under the scheme, those defendants who cooperated received favored
treatment. Several officers who admitted guilt retired with pensions and were
not prosecuted. At least one officer who admitted guilt was permitted to remain in the police department. Several officers who were indicted and subsequently pleaded guilty to 'educed charges received relatively light sentences.
The officers who were convicted after trial received substantial sentences.
Those officers who cooperated after conviction received reduced sentences.
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devised, 12 candidly admitted his discomfort with the role in
which it placed him:
The net result of this pattern of sentencing is and has been to
make the Court in effect a party to the Government's attempt to obtain
testimony to further uncover crimes and obtain convictions of
criminals who constituted a serious threat to society.
I have substantial doubt, and I am uncomfortable with the seamy
[W] hether other judges take
position that this puts the courts in ....
the same position, I don't know.
There is a considerable amount of disagreement among the federal
members of the judiciary about these matters and other judges have
expressed different views.
My view is, however, it's proper for the judge to take all these matters in account and in effect to cooperate with the Government's attempt to obtain information and testimony.
The sentencing pattern is used by the courts for a purpose which is
not generally stated in any of the literature or in any of the standards.
It's not used for rehabilitation. It's not used for incapacitation or used
for specific or general deterrence.
It is used coercively in order to obtain information. It can be argued that this is a misuse of sentencing power. If it is such a misuse, I
would like to be so instructed by the appellate courts, because I say I
find the whole situation rather uncomfortable.
...
[T] his whole situation is extremely dangerous because abuses
by the U.S. Attorney and others are possible, because jurors who hear
of this hold the law in disdain and because the judges, rather than having a position of impartiality, standing above this entire system, in ef13
fect are made part of the system.

Judge Weinstein's doubts present deeply troubling questions. Does a judge step outside of his appropriate role in our
adversary system when he uses his awesome sentencing powers to aid prosecutors and law enforcement officials? What are
the currently developed and accepted bounds of his power to
do so? From an acceptable moral perspective on the justification for punishment, what are the ethical limits, if any, on the
use of differential sentencing to induce cooperation? What procedural safeguards are required to adequately protect the legal
and moral rights of defendants whose cooperation is sought?
Finally, what are the practical barriers to judicial implementathese problems?
tion of a coherent theoretical approach to
This Article will address these questions. It begins with a
description of the variety of coercive sentencing practices and
then explicates and defends a normative scheme for evaluating
these procedures, deriving certain moral limitations. The ArtiSee United States v. Codelia, No. 74-CR-729 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1976) (motion
for reduction of sentence and stay of execution).
13. Id.
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cle then examines the relationship between such ethical constraints and the constitutional implications of coercive
sentencing, and delineates a series of procedural safeguards for
ensuring the effective protection of defendants' substantive
rights.
I.
A.

COERCIVE SENTENCING PRACTICES

DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCING AND PLEA BARGAINING

Although a guilty plea may occasionally be the unilateral
product of the defendant's genuine remorse, his blind faith in
the compassion of an otherwise stern court, or his ignorance of
the advantages to be gained by manipulating the system, it is
infinitely more likely to result from a bargaining process in
which the guilty plea is tendered in return for inducements
proferred-explicitly or implicitly-by judges, prosecutors, or
both.14
The usual terms of the bargain are fairly straightforward.
The defendant waives a jury trial and consents to a judgment
of conviction against him.15 Somewhat more rarely, the defendant waives the right to a jury trial and consents to trial by the
court. In return for a waiver, the defendant may receive one or
a combination of the following benefits: (1) acceptance of a
"lesser plea" in satisfaction of other pending charges; (2) agreement not to seek further charges; (3) the prosecutor's recommendation of a particular sentence or, at least, his promise to
refrain from opposing defendant's request in this matter; and
6
(4) leniency toward others.'
14. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice reported that 90% of all defendants plead guilty. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT. THE COURTS 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. In
New York City, in 1974, 80% of all defendants who were initially charged with
felonies ultimately pleaded guilty to misdemeanors after negotiations, and only
2% of all felony arrests resulted in trial. See Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the
Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 93 (1976).
15. In addition to the right to a jury trial, the defendant waives the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself, the right to compulsory process to call witnesses,
the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceedings
against him, and, if necessary, the right to have an attorney appointed to represent him. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
16. See generally ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.1, at
72-74 (1968); ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARPRAIGNmENT PROCEDURE, Commentary
on § 350.3, at 609-17 (1975); A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967); D. NEWMAN,
CONvICTION:

TE

DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHoUT TRIAL

(1966); Alschuler, The Trial Judge'sRole in Plea Bargaining (pt 1), 76 COLUM.
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1. Acceptance of a Lesser Plea
Upon agreeing to waive a jury trial, the defendant may be

permitted to plead guilty to a lesser charge than the most serious brought by indictment. Through such an agreement, the
defendant affects the limits of the sentencing judge's discretion. The offense to which the defendant pleads guilty may expose him to a lower maximum penalty, may have a lower
legislatively mandated minimum sentence, or may lack any leg7
islative provision precluding probation.'
2. Agreement Not to Prosecute
Closely related to the plea to a lesser charge is the defendant's surrender of rights with respect to one or more charges in
satisfaction of all other charges that have already been brought
or that could be brought. By pleading guilty to only some of
the potential charges, the defendant avoids the possibility of
conviction on additional counts that would expose him to consecutive sentences and increased total incarceration.' 8
L. REV. 1059 (1976); Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critiqueof FourModels, 41 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 102 (1977).
17. Reduction of the charge may produce benefits independent of the effect
on the potential sentence. For example, indirect repercussions may flow from
conviction for certain crimes, such as the social stigma associated with offenses
involving aberrant sexual behavior. A guilty plea to a charge not involving such
conduct may avoid such consequences.
18. Such arrangements do not, as some defendants assume, eliminate any
possible effect of the additional unprosecuted offenses on the ultimate disposition of the case. Within the sentencing limits legislatively mandated for the
crime to which a plea is accepted, the court may lawfully consider the uncharged crimes (as well as other factors in the defendant's background). See
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949); United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843
(1965). Congress recently reaffirmed this fundamental sentencing principle:
"No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976). Other apparent benefits may be similarly illusory. For example, judges rarely, if ever, impose the maximum
sentence permissible for the most serious crime with which the defendant
might have been charged. Similarly, the minimum some judges would impose
on the lower charge may be higher than the legislatively required minimum for
the higher charge. Finally, it may be that courts do not, as a general matter,
sentence consecutively for multiple counts of the "same crime." See ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIvES AND PROCEDURES §

3.4(b),

at 23 (1968) ("Consecutive sentences are rarely appropriate. Authority to imstatutory limitapose a consecutive sentence should be circumscribed by...
tions.").
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3. Sentencing Recommendations
Although a prosecutor's dismissal of some charges and acceptance of a plea to a lesser charge may reduce to some extent
the trial judge's sentencing discretion, the court's discretion
nonetheless remains quite broad under most modern statutes.19 For this reason, a defendant may seek to induce the
prosecutor to recommend a disposition more favorable to the
defendant than might otherwise result. The terms of the plea

bargain may simply require that the prosecutor refrain from
recommending anything to the court and not oppose the defendant's suggested disposition. Most often, however, the defor the prosecutor's affirmative
fendant bargains
recommendation of a specific sentence, or at least a specific
maximum. Although such a recommendation is not formally
binding on the court, it is usually incorporated in the final dis20

position.

4. Leniency Toward Others
Although the usual plea bargain involves an advantage
promised directly to the defendant, occasionally the defendant's waiver is offered in return for some form of leniency to-

ward another person, often a family member implicated in the
same or similar crimes. 21 For example, an individual might
19. Furthermore, it is virtually hornbook law that any penalty imposed
within statutory limits will be undisturbed on appeal. See Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) ("once it is determined that a sentence is within
the limitations set forth in the statute... , appellate review is at an end"). See
generally ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 1-6
(Supp. 1968); M. FRANKEL, CRmUMNA SENTENCES: LAW WrrHotrr ORDER 5-49
(1973); Note, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Needfor a Reviewable Record, 1973 DUKE LJ. 1357. See also United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099,
1121 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Cowles,
503 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975); United States v.
Moore, 454 F.2d 286 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 406 U.S. 946 (1972).
In addition, sentences imposed in a proper manner within the statutory
maximum are generally not subject to collateral attack. See United States v.
Mejias, 552 F.2d 435, 447 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Seijo, 537 F.2d 694, 700
(2d Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1043 (1977); United States v. Malcolm, 432
F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir. 1970). But see Kortness v. United States, 514 F.2d 167, 170
(8th Cir. 1975).
20. See Alschuler, supra note 16, at 1061-99.
21. The relatively scarce case law supports the practice. See Crow v.
United States, 397 F.2d 284 (10th Cir. 1968); Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1964); Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795 (1st Cir. 1959); Thomas v.
Warden, 236 F. Supp. 499 (D. Md. 1964). See also Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to Voluntariness and Understandingof Guilty Pleas,1970 WASH. U.
L.Q. 289, 309 (1970).
In reliance on this case law, the Council of the American Law Institute
eliminated a proposed provision of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proce-
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plead guilty to charges of income tax evasion in return for dismissal of similar charges against the defendant's spouse.
Although the motivating force behind most defendants'
guilty pleas is an attempt to affect the severity of the sentence
to be imposed, the role in the bargaining process of the trial
judge, upon whom ultimate responsibility for that decision uniformly devolves, varies greatly among jurisdictions.2 2 But however large or small the judge's role in the negotiations leading
to the plea, it is clear that all systems of plea bargaining rely on
sentencing differentials-that is, coercive sentencing-to attain
their goals. Whether the ultimate differential is the product of
charge reductions initiated by prosecutors and ratified by
courts, unilateral prosecutorial decisions to refrain from bringing charges, prosecutorial sentencing recommendations routinely ratified by courts, or the court's own practice of
sentencing more severely those who exercise their right to
trial, it is the fear of penalty or the hope of leniency that is, in
the end, the chief moving force behind our system of criminal
justice by guilty plea.
B.

COERCED TESrnMONY AND UNDERCOVER WORK

A plea-bargaining defendant usually gains sentencing concessions solely in return for his waiver of a jury trial and related rights. Frequently, however, the prosecutor or court
demands more, and requires that the defendant testify against
others at trial or before a grand jury,23 supply information in
extrajudicial contexts to law enforcement personnel,24 or accept the role of active undercover informant, stool pigeon, or
25
agent provocateur.
"Courts have countenanced the use of informers from time
immemorial." 26 In medieval England, an accused felon could
confess and inform on others. If those named were ultimately
convicted, he was released; if they were acquitted, he was
dure that would have prohibited offering lenient treatment to a person other
than the defendant as an inducement for a guilty plea. See AU MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Commentary on § 350.3, at 615-16 (1975).
22. See Alschuler, supra note 16, at 1061-99.
23. See, e.g., D. NEWmAN, supra note 16, at 186-87.
24. See, e.g., R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH,
AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 177-79 (1969).
25. See id. at 183-84; Donnelly, JudicialControl of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs,60 YALE L.T. 1091 (1951).
26. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.).
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hanged. 2 7 Although there is little available empirical data on
the current use of informers, it is generally conceded that the
practice is widespread, 28 particularly in narcotics enforcement 2 9 and control of organized crime. 30
Although many law enforcement agencies rely in part on
monetary rewards for information on law violations, the most
persuasive inducement for individuals to assume informant duties is lenient treatment of their own criminality.3 ' Informers
usually receive the kinds of leniency that are given in return
for a "simple" guilty plea. The informant is either not charged
with a crime committed, charged with a less serious crime, or
given a lesser prison sentence than would otherwise have been
imposed. In some cases, the defendant will be given probation
despite the trial judge's view that there is such a substantial
risk of recidivism that incarceration would normally be re2
quired.3
As in simple plea bargaining, it is the fact of differential sentencing-the hope of leniency or fear of enhanced punishment-that induces cooperation.
27. See A. STEPHEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM THE THIRTEENTH TO THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 485 (1908).
28. See . DAWSON, supra note 24, at 96; M. HARNEY & J. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAw ENFORCEMENT 14 (2d ed. 1968); W. LAFAvE, ARRES. THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 133 (1965); Misner & Clough, Arrestees
as Informants: A ThirteenthAmendment Analysis, 29 STAN. L. REV. 713, 714-15
(1977). Legal protection against being informed on is rigidly circumscribed.

See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) ("Neither this Court nor
any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.").
29. Undercover informers carry out an estimated 90% of police-"encouraged" drug sales. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF

CRIME 252 (1967).
30. See M. HARNEY & 3. CROSS, supra note 28, at 23-30; D. NEwmAN, supra
note 16, at 194.
31.

See IL DAwSoN, supra note 24, at 96.

32. See id. In addition, enforcement services by prison inmates may be rewarded with parole concessions. Dawson offers the illustration of an inmate of
a correctional institution who would not have been paroled on the basis of rehabilitation:
The inmate had been convicted of assault with intent to rob, for which
he was placed on probation. After one year of supervision, he violated
probation and received a prison sentence of one to ten years. This was
his initial parole hearing. The sentencing judge and the prosecuting attorney both recommended a parole denial. He had a prior record of assault. His LQ. was recorded as 63. Shortly before his hearing, the

inmate had learned of an escape plot involving four inmates who were
hiding in a tunnel He tipped off a guard and the inmates were apprehended. The board decided to grant parole.
Id. at 287.
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MAGNITUDE OF SENTENCING DIFFERENTIALS

While the existence of even slight sentencing differentials

conditioned on the waiver of rights or other forced cooperation
might suggest potentially troubling legal and moral objections,
the actual incremental differences are great and thus raise fundamental questions of justification. Data compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shows a massive
and disturbing disparity between the average sentence weight
for federal defendants who pleaded guilty at arraignment and
3
those convicted of the same offenses following a jury trial. 3
Although no similar empirical studies exist on the disparity
33. For all reported offense classes, the average sentence weight was 4.7
for those defendants who pleaded guilty at arraignment, while it was 13.5 for
those convicted by a jury. For marijuana offenses, the average sentence weight
for defendants who pleaded guilty was 5.3, while it was 16.4 for those convicted
by a jury. The contrast was 1.8 versus 7.0 for violations of federal regulatory
statutes, 1.6 versus 7.0 for immigration law violations, and 9.2 versus 26.8 for
narcotics offenses. ADmSTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNrrED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE UNrrED STATES DISTRiCT COURTS, Table 16, at 55 (1971).
In order to facilitate the grouping of data, the Administrative Office uses a
conversion scheme, transforming actual sentences into average sentence
weights. See id. at 29. The use of average sentence weights for purposes of
comparison actually understates the true disparities. If average sentence
weights are transformed into months of sentence actually imposed, it appears
that the average sentence length for all reported offenses ranged between 6.1
and 11.1 months for those defendants who pleaded guilty, while it ranged between 46.0 and 57.0 months for those convicted after exercising their right to a
jury trial. This means that for all offenses reported, defendants convicted by a
jury received sentences between 5.14 and 7.54 times as long as defendants who
pleaded guilty at arraignment. These sentences were between 39.9 months and
45.9 months longer on the average.
The extreme disproportions between sentence lengths for defendants convicted after exercising the right to a jury trial and sentence lengths for those
who pleaded guilty at arraignment are consistently evident and consistently
overwhelming.
A correlational study of factors related to sentencing, reported by the U.S.
Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National
Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, provides an additional perspective on the relationship between average sentence weights and process
variables such as pleading guilty at arraignment or standing trial For narcotics
offenses, more of the variance in average sentence weight was accounted for by
the variables "plea of guilty at arraignment" and "conviction at trial" than any
other variables, including previous criminal record and age of defendant. L
STJTroN, FEDERAL SENTENCING PATTERNS:

A STUDY

OF GEOGRAPHICAL VARIA-

TIONS 17-19 (1978). For auto thefts, method of conviction was second only to
previous criminal record in determining the severity of the sentence received.
Id. at 17.
Because of the post hoc nature of this analysis, it cannot be demonstrated
conclusively that the reported disparities in sentence were caused by the exercise of the right to trial. It is possible that the exercise of trial rights is correlated with some other variable which in fact causes increased severity in
sentence. Nevertheless, while it is impossible to rule out all conceivable alternative explanations, analysis of the studies fails to support variables such as
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in sentencing based on cooperation other than by guilty plea,
two points are worth noting. First, to the extent that a prosecutor's willingness to offer or accept a plea bargain depends on
the defendant's willingness to aid in other prosecutions, figures
on plea bargaining incorporate sentencing differentials imposed
for other coercive purposes. Second, the facts of the relatively
few reported cases dealing with sentences imposed for failure
to cooperate suggest that the degree of sentence disparity is
34
roughly as great as in the context of pure plea bargaining.
Whether the data relied on is the product of formal empirical research or is more anecdotal and impressionistic, the enormity of established sentencing differentials for coercive
purposes raises serious ethical questions concerning the proper
exercise of judicial sentencing discretion, and requires a. serious study of the values served and the permissibility of the
means employed.
Im.

ETHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COERCION

The principles that govern the sentencing decision, and the
purposes it is to serve, should not be ad hoc rules created for
the limited purpose of guiding trial courts in disposing of criminal cases. Sentencing is an act of profoundly moral dimensions
and must be guided by rules derived from the same moral principles that we are prepared to defend as guides in all situations
of ethical choice, whether within or without the legal system.
Absent such explicitly formulated and followed norms, a system of lawful punishment degenerates into the chaotic and lawless imposition of rationally indefensible suffering.
There are, of course, judges, lawyers, and academics who
question the desirability of engaging in philosophical speculation in situations concerning the actual imposition of severe
punishments upon real-life defendants by real-life courts. They
accept without qualification H.LA. Hart's observation:
No one expects judges or statesmen occupied in the business of
sending people to the gallows or prison, or in making (or unmaking)
sex, race, age, or prior record as explanations of the effect associated with fail-

ing to plead guilty.
34. See, e.g., DiGiovanni v. United States, 596 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1979) (vacating sentence of five years' imprisonment plus three years' special parole

term, a sentence imposed, in part, as additional punishment for defendant's
"reluctance ... to assist the government"); United States v. Ramos, 572 F.2d
360, 362 (2d Cir. 1978) (vacating sentence of ten years' imprisonment plus ten
years' special parole term for "mule" in narcotics transaction on the ground

that sentence might have resulted from defendant's refusal to testify in another
case).
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laws which enable this to be done, to have much time for philosophical
discussion of the principles which make it morally tolerable to do these
35
things. A judicial bench is not and should not be a professorial chair.

As a matter purely of human psychology, it is understandable that judges faced with the terrible reality that the imposition of a prison sentence may result in the defendant's physical
and mental brutalization, sexual abuse, and permanent injury
or death, might question the value of debates between Kantians and Benthamites, intuitionists and positivists. Such questioning implies that the outcome of these debates is irrelevant
to the ultimate guidance of judicial conduct; that while the determination to place an individual on probation rather than to
incarcerate him has enormous personal ramifications for the
defendant, the court's adoption of a retributivist rather than a
utilitarian perspective on punishment does not. That implication, however, is wrong. The decision to incarcerate and the
sentence imposed may largely depend upon the normative
36
standards that are adopted to justify punishment.
Each such ethical standard, when applied to the facts of an
individual case, establishes what may be called a "maximum
appropriate sentence"--that is, an upper limit beyond which
punishment, though authorized by positive law, is morally indefensible. This concept of a maximum appropriate sentence is
a critical element of any coherent sentencing scheme, and
plays an indispensable role in analyzing the permissible scope
of coercive punishment. As the following sections demonstrate,
however, the two systems most often appealed to in ethical
judgments employ significantly different definitions of the maximum appropriate penalty, and in practice may justify incompatible sentencing practices. Critical evaluation of both
systems suggests that neither alone is ultimately justifiable,
but that a synthesis of the two is possible and defensible. That
synthesis is then provided, and a set of moral principles to
which rational individuals would turn to decide any moral dispute is explicated and defended. The implications of that theory for sentencing practices are derived, and a system for
evaluating the permissible nature and scope of coercive sentencing is described.
35. H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPoNsmIurY 2 (1968).
36. The current debate over the desirability of determinate sentencing furnishes just one illustration of the manner in which the philosophical perspective adopted may affect the form and substance of the practice of courts and
legislatures. See, e.g., N. MORmS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); FAIR
AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 4; A. VON HIRSCH, ,upra note 4.
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A. UTLIARiASM
Until recently, an examination of the literature on criminal
sentencing would have established near-unanimity about the
objectives that justify punishment: incapacitation, rehabilitation, specific deterrence, and general deterrence. The enumeration of these specific justifications for punishment represents
an implicit, and often explicit, adoption of a utilitarian moral
theory. It is therefore appropriate to begin with consideration
of that normative system.
Utilitarianism is grounded on one basic tenet: It is right for
an agent to perform an act, X, if, but only if, of all the possible
alternative actions open to the agent, X will, actually or probably, produce the consequences having the maximum amount of
intrinsic value.3 7 Formulated less rigorously, utilitarians are
moral teleologists or consequentialists; they assert that the
rightness or wrongness of an act is a function of the act's efficacy in producing good consequences. Under the utilitarian approach, the actor must, in any situation of moral choice,
consider the total consequences of each alternative possible
course of action and choose that action with the greatest overall balance of good results over bad. The "rightness" of actions
38
is thus determined by the "goodness" of ends.
The standard traditionally used to evaluate the relative
goodness of ends has been the happiness, pleasure, or wellbeing of each individual affected by the act.3 9 Only pain and
pleasure, and happiness and unhappiness, are viewed as bad or
good in themselves; all other things and actions are instrumentally good-that is, good as means to desirable ends. Reduced
37. See generally M. BAYLES, CoNTEMPoRARY UT1rARIAISM (1968); D.
HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM (1967); D. LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILrARIANISM (1965).
38. Of the intrinsic value or goodness of ends, G.E. Moore wrote:
By calling one effect or set of effects intrinsically better than another it means that it is better in itself, quite apart from any accompaniments or further effects which it may have. That is to say: To assert
of any one thing, A, that it is intrinsically better than another, B, is to
assert that if A existed quite alone, without any accompaniments or efin short, A constituted the whole Universe, it would
fects whateverbe better that such a Universe should exist, than that a Universe which
consisted solely of B should exist instead.
G. MOORE, ETmIcs 37 (1947). See also Baylis, Grading, Values and Choice, 67

MIND 485, 490 (1958).
39. Mill wrote that "'utility' or the 'greatest happiness principle' holds that
actions are right as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure." J.S. Mn,

UTArrmsm 10 (1957).
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to its simplest terms, utilitarianism holds that an act is morally
acceptable if it maximizes overall social well-being, measured
in terms of people's happiness, and affords no independent
moral weight to any principle that limits the maximization of
such happiness.
The specific implications of this general theory for criminal
law and. punishment were clearly drawn by Jeremy Bentham:
The business of government is to promote the happiness of the society,
by punishing and rewarding ... In proportion as an act tends to disturb that happiness, in proportion as the tendency of it is pernicious,
will be the demand it creates for punishment....
... But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is
evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it
ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some
greater evil.4°

In general utilitarian terms, then, the criminal law accomplishes its aim by excluding those types of conduct with consequences that detract from the general intrinsic good. Punishing
lawbreakers by imprisonment or fines, however, also inflicts
suffering and is therefore a prima facie evil that can be justified
only if it prevents still greater evil from occurring, and if the total utility of the system is greater than the total utility of any
other possible system that also serves to gain conformity to
law.4 1 From this perspective, the maximum appropriate penalty is that which, on a total "cost-benefit" analysis, maximizes
societal happiness. Therefore, in order to show that any form
of coercive sentencing is justifiable on utilitarian grounds, it is
necessary to demonstrate both that such sentencing can have
good consequences, and that the total value of those consequences is greater than the harm inflicted on defendants and
society.
It is at least prima facie plausible to claim that coercive
sentencing is justified on grounds of utility. The rapid processing of cases through the criminal justice system by plea bargaining results in speedier trials for those who plead not guilty
and frees scarce monetary resources for use in socially beneficial programs.4 2 The supplying of information and testimony
by defendants and their use as active informants serves to detect and prevent crime.43 Arguably, the total good of these ben40. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAUS AND LEGISLATION- 70, 170 (L. LaFleur ed. 1948).
41.

See R.B. BRANyr, ETHICAL THEORY 490 (1959).

42.

See notes 175-178 infra and accompanying text.

43.

See notes 23-32 supra and accompanying text.
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efits is greater than the suffering imposed on those defendants
who are encouraged to cooperate. Coercive sentencing may,
then, satisfy the utilitarian principle. Unless, however, it can
further be shown that utilitarianism itself furnishes an acceptable philosophical perspective on punishment generally, it cannot be concluded that any form of coercive punishment is
justifiable, simpliciter.
Unless we are prepared to abandon a fundamental and
common-sense moral belief, utilitarianism must be rejected as
the ultimate standard by reference to which such matters are
to be decided. It must be rejected because it fails to account
for the duty to requite desert-to give individuals that which
they deserve. As John Stuart Mill acknowledged,
it is universally considered just that each person should obtain that
(whether good or evil) which he deserves; and unjust that he should
obtain a good, or be made to undergo an evil, which he does not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest and most emphatic form in which
the idea of justice is conceived by the general mind. 4 4

One need search neither long nor hard in the philosophical
literature, though, to find numerous hypothetical cases demonstrating that an action which serves to maximize utility fails to
requite desert and is therefore unjust and morally wrong. Critics of the utilitarian approach provide examples of imposed
sanctions which, although undeserved, may nevertheless serve
to minimize future harm. Typically, these examples focus on
instances of "illegal" punishment of the morally innocent.45
Instances of undeserved sanctions are not, however, limited to "illegal" punishment of morally blameless individuals.
An illustration of this is furnished by the recent radical revision of views on the rehabilitative model of sentencing. 46 In
part, the massive professional and academic disillusionment
with the therapeutic model stems from the simple practical inability of the criminal justice system to reform serious offend44. J.S. MiLL, UTrrAiAmSM 41 (1910).
45. [T] he utilitarian must hold that we are justified in inflicting pain
always and only in order to prevent worse pain or bring about greater
happiness. This, then, is all we need to consider in so-called punishment, which must be purely preventive. But if some kind of very cruel
crime becomes common, and none of the criminals can be caught, it
might be highly expedient, as an example, to hang an innocent man, if
a charge against him could be so framed that he were universally
thought guilty; indeed this would only fail to be an ideal instance of
utilitarian "punishment" because the victim himself would not have
been so likely as a real felon to commit such a crime in the future; in
all other respects it would be perfectly deterrent and therefore felicific.
E. CARRrrr, ETmcIAL AND POLmrCAL THINNG 65 (1947) (footnote omitted).
46. See notes 163-167 infra and accompanying text.
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ers effectively through incarceration. 4 7 An additional and
significant factor, however, is the jurisprudential realization
that even if offenders could be rehabilitated through sufficiently protracted sentences, such disproportionate punishment is morally impermissible. 4 8 It is simply not viewed as
justifiable to impose undeservedly severe sanctions on an individual merely to gain some increase in overall social good. 4 9
Utilitarians have not ignored such criticisms of their theory. They have made serious efforts to reconcile the duty to requite desert with the keystone of utility, future harm
minimization.5 0 In pursuit of such a reconciliation, some have
declared that the duty to requite desert and future harm minimization can never be truly at odds because they are merely
different names for a single concept; a deserved punishment,
properly understood, is nothing more than that punishment
which will optimally reduce future suffering.51
Such a claim, however, ignores a fundamental aspect of the
notion of desert: "desert," as contrasted with "utility," is a

47. See FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 4, at 83-91; A. VON
HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 11-18.
48. The most recent in a spate of acknowledgments of this moral truth has
been made by Professor Alschuler.
That I and many other academics adhered in large part to this reformative viewpoint only a decade or so ago seems almost incredible to
most of us today. To probe a person's psyche and predict his future behavior is always an awesome task, and the optimistic belief that one
can discern a person's general propensity for law observance from his
regimented conduct in a prison now seems remarkably naive. Although not all of us are ready simply to abandon rehabilitation as one
objective of the criminal process (at least not in every circumstance),
we have become far less ambitious in pursuing this goal than we were
a few years ago when we encouraged our state legislatures to adopt
some variation of the Model Penal Code's sentencing scheme. Our
general disillusionment with rehabilitative goals stems from both jurisprudential and pragmatic considerations. Even if the state could
achieve its rehabilitative objectives far more often than it does, we
have become doubtful that an offender's wrongdoing justifies a broad
assumption of governmental power over his personality.
Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent
Proposalsfor "Fixed"and "Presumptive"Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 552
(1978).
49. This is not to say that overall social well-being never justifies a departure from just deserts. Given a sufficiently great social advantage to be gained,
or some substantial increase in the protection of the rights of others, the rights
of some individuals may be infringed. See notes 73-81 infra and accompanying
text.
50. See Brandt, Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism,in MoRaIxrY
AND THE LANGUAGE OF CONDUCT 107 (H. Castaneda & G. Nakhmldan eds. 1963);
Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REv. 3 (1955); Sprigge, A UtilitarianReply to Dr.McCloskey, 8 INQUIRY 264 (1965).
51. See J.S. MILT, UTrr, ANisM 52-79 (1957).
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past-oriented concept. To say that a person deserves a particular punishment is to claim that there is a propriety in imposing
it on him. This propriety exists because of a proportion or balance, not between the harm of the penalty and the harm prevented by deterrence (a future fact), but rather between the
harm of the penalty and the culpability of the offender (a past
fact). Desert, as a conceptually backward-looking notion, examines the properties of the action committed, rather than the
properties of the future actions deterred.
Perhaps acknowledging this, some utilitarians have offered
the alternative thesis that, although conceptually distinct, desert and utility are factually coextensive-that all and only
those punishments that satisfy the criteria of desert will in fact
maximize future well-being.5 2 This empirical claim, although
backed by the full force of utilitarian faith, is never supported
by factual data, and as an impressionistic matter, seems patently false. However unsuccessful the rehabilitative model of
punishment has been as a general matter, it is reasonable to
assume that there are in fact some individuals who, after serving disproportionately long prison sentences, emerge "1reformed." If only one such case can be found, the coextensivity
thesis stands refuted. In any event, the utilitarian proponents
of that thesis have failed to meet their burden of coming forward with evidence in its support.
Utilitarians are left, then, to defend the thesis that "very
often" those actions that minimize future harm will also requite desert. Although such a correlation may in fact exist,
utilitarians can only defend their norm if they can also argue
convincingly that it is morally right to follow the course of utility at the expense of the satisfaction of desert in all cases in
which desert and future harm minimization are not coextensive.
Perhaps in certain instances it is considered morally permissible to sacrifice desert for utility. For example, in constitutional law, individual rights, even those ranked as fundamental,
may be overridden when necessary to serve compelling state
interests. 5 3 If such interests could be served by inflicting undeserved suffering, such a course might be thought justifiable.
The utilitarian, however, is not committed to inflicting undeserved punishment only when the interest to be served is compelling. He is committed to any'action that will increase utility
52. See Sprigge, supra note 50.
53.

See generally L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1978).
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even by the smallest conceivable amount.5 4 But is this what we
really believe about the duty to punish justly? Do we think
such a duty may be overridden for the slightest increase in
good consequences? The answer must surely be "no." We certainly are not willing to admit that in every instance in which
utility can be slightly enhanced we may, in fact must, inflict undeserved punishment. 55 Unless we are willing to abandon the
duty to requite desert as a touchstone of the validity of any
proposed ethical principle, we must reject the utilitarian model
as the ultimate moral standard by which to determine the justifiability of imposing sanctions.

B. RETRIBUTION
In sharp contrast to the utilitarian theory, which fails to adequately accommodate claims of moral desert, stands the retributive theory of justice, to which such claims are
fundamental. The basic tenet of the retributive theory of justice is that regardless of consequences, deserved punishment is
always either just or of some positive moral worth, and undeserved punishment is always either unjust or of some negative
moral worth.56
The most famous retributive theory of punishment, that of
Immanuel Kant, was derived from a general theory of duty or
obligation.5 7 That theory proposed a supreme law of morality,
the Categorical Imperative, embodied in the "Principle of Humanity": "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a
54. See W. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 22 (1930).
55. Moreover, when such a violation of the duty to requite desert is countenanced, it would be at the expense of an important principle:
Given enough misery to be avoided by the sacrifice of an innocent
person, there may be situations in which it might be thought morally
permissible to take this step. But, again, if we took the step, we would
have to face a clash between two principles. We would then sacrifice
the principle of fairness designed to protect the individual from society
to the principle that an overwhelming advantage to society should be
secured at any cost, but a clash between two principles is different
from the simple application of a single utilitarian principle that anything which benefits society is permissible.
H. HART, supra note 35, at 81. The utilitarian sacrifices no principle in such
cases. His action satisfies the only principle which he recognizes as valid.
56. "Virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the highest good for one person, and happiness in exact proportion to morality (as the
worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes that of a possible world." I. KANT,CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 215 (L Beck trans. 1949).
57. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (L. Beck

trans. 1959).
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means only."58 Kant expressly discussed the implications of

this view for punishment:
Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but
instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that
he has committed a crime; for a human being can never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of someone else and can
never be confused with the objects of the Law of things.... His innate
personality (that is, his right as a person) protects him against such
treatment, even though he may indeed be condemned to lose his civil
personality. He must first be found deserving of punishment before
any consideration is given to the utility of this punishment for himself
or for his fellow citizens. The law concerning punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who rummages around in the winding
paths of a theory of happiness looking for some advantage to be gained
by releasing the criminal from punishment or by reducing the amount
of it. 5 9

Desert is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the justifiable imposition of punishment, and the amount of punishment that may be imposed is that which is proportionate,

appropriate, or fair.
This concept of "desert" or "deserved penalty," so fundamental to the retributive view and to the normative scheme
58. Id. at 47. It should be noted that the mere use of an individual as a
means to an end is not alone prohibited by the Categorical Imperative. If such
were the case, we would be prohibited from calling a doctor to treat our illness,
for in such cases we use the doctor as a means to the satisfaction of our own
ends. In fact, in virtually every interpersonal activity we use some person as a
means to some end. Clearly, Kant did not wish to prohibit, nor does the Categorical Imperative prohibit, such activities. Rather, the Categorical Imperative
condemns only those actions that use individuals solely as a means, that is,
where they are not, at the same time, considered "ends in themselves."
We may treat an individual as an "end in himself" in at least two ways:
negatively, by refraining from interfering with those of his actions that are in
pursuit of some subjective end, such as happiness, and that are nol themselves
immoral; and positively, by affirmatively acting to further the satisfaction of an
individual's ends. The patient who calls for a doctor to cure an illness follows
both practices. He does not interfere with the doctor's pursuit of his own chosen ends, which include the practice of medicine itself and the happiness that
results from the remuneration for his services. The patient, in fact, furthers
those ends by requesting medical, services.
59. L KANT,THE METAPHYSICAL ELEmENTs OF JUSTICE 100 (J. Ladd trans.
1965). Similarly, FR.Bradley wrote:
We pay the penalty, because we owe it, and for no other reason;
and if punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever than because it is merited by wrong, it is a gross immorality, a crying injustice,
an abominable crime, and not what it pretends to be. We may have regard for whatever considerations we please-our own convenience, the
good of society, the benefit of the offender; we are fools, and worse, if
we fail to do so. Having once the right to punish, we may modify the
punishment according to the useful and the pleasant; but these are external to the matter, they can not give us a right to punish, and nothing
can do that but criminal desert.
F. BRADLEY, ETHIcAL STUDIES 26-27 (2d ed. 1927).
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that, it will be argued, should be employed in delineating the
permissible scope of coercive sentencing, bears close scrutiny.
The claim that individual A deserves punishment P encompasses two claims: (1) A is morally blameworthy for some act
or omission, and (2) punishment P is "equivalent" to A's moral
fault. The general legal and philosophical problem concerning
the conditions under which a person can truly be considered
blameworthy is not implicated in the area of coercive sentencing.6 0 The more difficult problem is to determine when a punishment is "equivalent" to a person's blameworthiness.
Two potential solutions may be considered and rejected.
The first is suggested by the lex talionis: "an eye for an eye."
The equivalence between the crime and the punishment is realized when the offender is treated exactly as he has treated
others; a killer, for example, would forfeit his own life. There
are many offenses, however, for which an equivalent penalty is
hard to imagine. What, for example, is to be done to a traitor,
or to a forger?6 1 Furthermore, the approach is workable, if at
all, only for crimes intentionally committed. If I purposely take
a life, perhaps the fitting penalty is for my own life to be taken.
But what of the person who recklessly or negligently causes
death? Is he to suffer the same penalty as the intentional murderer? Even with respect to intentional crimes, the lex talionis
ignores elements of relative culpability now acknowledged as
essential components of any sentencing scheme 62 and commits
the state to impose punishment repugnant to any civilized society.
Little more convincing than the lex talionis is the modification that the amount, rather than the kind, of suffering inflicted
on a wrongdoer must equal the suffering produced by his
crime. Under such a view, could failed attempts be punished at
all? Would harms negligently caused be punished equally with
those recklessly or intentionally brought about?
A third possibility, that an individual's suffering by punishment must equal his culpability, approaches nearer the mark.
60. It is quite clear, in the ordinary case, that the defendant who is coerced
to plead guilty or cooperate with the state is a responsible agent who has committed a crime under circumstances evincing blameworthiness.
61. 'There are very many crimes that will in no shape admit of these penalties without absurdity and wickedness: theft cannot be punished by theft,
defamation by defamation, forgery by forgery; adultery by adultery." BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 3 (book IV), quoted in H.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND THE ELIMINATION OF RESPONSImIITY

6 (1962).

62. See Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAw & CONTEMP.PROB.528, 528-29 (1958).
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Under this proposal, culpability for a crime is a function of both
the seriousness of the harm sought to be prevented by the law
defining the crime and the actor's degree of responsibility for
that crime. There is, however, a fatal flaw in this proposal:
"[N]o penalty can be regarded as either equivalent or not
equivalent, in any factual sense, to a man's culpability in his offence. This is so because the distress of a penalty and the culpability of an offender are not commensurable. There are no
63
common units of measurement."
One apparent solution to this dilemma is the substitution
of "proportionality" for "equivalence." Under this approach, offenses are ranked by the comparative degree of culpability of
those who commit them, and punishments are ranked in order
of severity measured by the amount of suffering imposed. A
system of punishment would accord with desert if the penalty
for every offense were more severe than the penalty for all offenses of less culpability.64 Even this modification, however, is
subject to telling criticism. Assuming that an accurate scale of
crimes can be determined, it will be difficult, if not impossible,
to quantify the corresponding punishment. "While we can
know that first-degree murder should be higher than manslaughter, and that X+1 years is a weightier punishment than
X years, none of this tells us what we should substitute for X if
punishment is to match desert."65 Moreover, there is the problem of avoiding nonarbitrary intervals between crimes ranked
66
in order of severity.
In light of these difficulties and of the failure of recent attempts to formulate a precise formula for proportionality in
sentencing, 67 the obvious question is whether desert must be
63.

T. HONDERICH, PuNmISHENT- THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 28 (1971).

64. See Mundle, Punishment and Desert, 4 PmLosopmcAL Q. 222 (1954).
65. Pincoffs, Are Questions of Desert Decidable?,in JUSTICE AND PUNISHmENr, supra note 4, at 75, 85 (1977).
66. [I]f we rank crimes in order of their seriousness we still do not
know anything about the intervals between crimes on the scale. Thus,
if we have crimes ranked first through hundredth in ascending order of
seriousness it may still be the case that, while the 50th crime is only
slightly worse than the 49th, the 51st will be far worse than the 50th.
The consequence is that, given this possible disparity of intervals, it
seems simply arbitrary to move up the punishment scale by regular intervals in determining the punishment legislatively appropriate to the
49th, 50th, and 51st crimes. But, since the scale of crimes is an ordinal
one only, there's no way of calculatingthat the 51st crime is, say, twice
as bad as the 50th and that it therefore deserves twice as much punishment.
Id. (emphasis in original).
67. See A. VON HIRSCH, suprkg note 4, at 132-40; C. Card, Retributive Penal
Liability, 7 AM. PHLOSOPHICAL Q. MONOGRAPHS 17 (1973). Both works have
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abandoned as a meaningful or useful concept of punishment.
There are important reasons for a negative answer.
The mere fact that scholars have been unable to define
with mathematical precision the criteria of proportionality essential to the concept of desert does not make either desert or
proportionality a meaningless concept. It is an oft-voiced view
that a particular reported sentence was disproportionately lenient or severe; listeners to such assertions may vigorously disagree with the view expressed, but they do not in any way
consider it meaningless. So too with claims of desert. We all,
in our nonphilosophical moments, recognize the moral strength
and, a fortiori, the meaningfulness of claims based on the denial of a deserved good. Certainly there is a wide disparity in
views regarding what sentence is proportionate or appropriate
for a given criminal defendant. Such disagreement, however, is
not itself sufficient to invalidate the retributive scheme. Under
the alternative system of utilitarian punishment, there is in theory an empirically determinable ideal sentence-the one that
will maximize overall societal happiness. A trial judge cannot
readily determine which punishment satisfies that criterion. Is
five years in a given case of armed robbery the sentence best
fitted to serve the ends of deterrence, incapacitation, and reform? Is four years better suited to that goal, or six? Here, as
with retributive proportionality, certain sentences are clearly
too severe and others too lenient. Within these broadly defined
limits, judges' beliefs concerning the useful consequences of
their acts may vary widely. Such variations in belief, while resulting in a troubling lack of uniformity in sentencing, have not
been thought to be sufficient to invalidate empirically grounded
theories of punishment. Similarly, disagreements about proportionate penalties should not lead to abandonment of the retributive principle, unless we are also prepared to abandon the
basic concept of desert that underlies much of our general notion of social justice.
In addition to their moral significance, and despite
problems of Verifiability, the fact that desert claims are intelligible and forceful has been acknowledged as a matter of both
state and federal constitutional dimensions. 68 Although recogbeen critically analyzed by Hugo Bedau. See Bedau, Concessions to Retribution
in Punishment,in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 4, at 51, 65-67.
68. In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), a defendant convicted on multiple counts of unauthorized sale of liquor was sentenced alternatively to a fine
of over $6,000 or more than 54 years at hard labor. Although a majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court declined on grounds of federal-state comity to decide
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nizing, with the California Supreme Court, that "[w]hether a
particular punishment is disproportionate to the offense is, of
course, a question of degree," 69 and that the "choice of fitting
and proper penalties is not an exact science," 70 it seems clear
that proportionality is a legally and ethically necessary element
of an acceptable system of punishment.
Although recognition of desert claims is a critical element
of any justifiable scheme of punishment, retribution cannot and
should not be the sole end of such a system. The retributive
theory of justice, as noted earlier,7 1 requires not only that the
guilty be punished, but also that the blameless not be punished; undeserved punishment is, according to the pure retributive scheme, an incommensurable evil. Under a system of pure

retribution, any system of criminal laws and sanctions is unjustifiable, since any such system will undoubtedly punish some
innocent or blameless individuals, given empirical difficulties in
whether such a sentence violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the eighth amendment, Justice Field stated in dissent that the sentence was
"one which, in its severity, considering the offences of which [the defendant]
was convicted, may justly be termed both unusual and cruel." Id. at 339. While
acknowledging that the eighth amendment was traditionally thought to apply
to physically torturous methods of punishment, Justice Field found that the
prohibition was broader in scope: 'The inhibition is directed ...
against all
punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged. The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive. . . " Id. at 339-40.
Justice Field's dissenting view in O'Neil became law less than two decades
later in the landmark case of Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In
that case, the Supreme Court reviewed a sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment for a small embezzlement. The Court quoted the forgoing language from
O'Neil and noted that "imprisonment in the State prison for a long term of
years might be so disproportionate to the offense as to constitute a cruel and
unusual punishment." Id. at 368 (quoting McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173
Mass. 322, 328, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (1899)). Examining the sentence in this light, the
Court observed: "Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have
formed their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens
from the practice of the American commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense." 217 U.S. at 366-67.
There have been similar interpretations of state constitutional requirements. See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 413, 424, 503 P.2d 921, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217,
226 (1972); State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 57-58, 245 P.2d 788, 792 (1952); Dembrowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 254, 240 N.E.2d 815, 817 (1968); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Ky. 1968); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 176,
194 N.W.2d 827, 831 (1972); State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 353, 46 S.E.2d 273,
275 (1948).
69. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 413, 423, 503 P.2d 921, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226
(1972).
70. Id.
71. See text accompanying note 56 supra and accompanying text.
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fact-finding and human fallibility on the part of lawyers, prosecutors, jurors, and judges.
Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to inflict punishment
on the guilty without also causing undeserved suffering to the
offender's family and friends. If such undeserved punishment
or suffering is incommensurable with societal protection from
harm through a code of criminal law backed by sanctions generally applied only to the blameworthy, then all punishment
must stop. If punishment can only be inflicted when it is certain that no innocent person will ever suffer as a result, we can
never punish. Surely no proponent of the retributive theory of
justice would wish to defend such a position. In order to permit the undeserved suffering of a few individuals, which is necessary to achieve a system of protective criminal law, we must
move from retribution as the sole justification for criminal
sanctions to a scheme that also recognizes utilitarian considerations.
C. PLURAUSM
Pluralism is a justifiable synthesis of utilitarianism and the
retributive theory of justice. Pluralism adopts the utilitarian
view that punishment is ultimately justified by its ends, but rejects the utilitarian commitment to any action that will bring
the slightest increase in utility over other alternatives. Instead,
in deference to the moral force of claims of desert, pluralism
accepts certain limitations on the pursuit of the general good
through punishment.
Pluralism recognizes the powerful element of truth expressed by each of these two principles: (1) punish individuals
whenever, and only when, such punishment will increase societal well-being; and (2) punish all and only those individuals
who are deserving of such treatment. Pluralism acknowledges,
however, that these principles may conflict; situations may
arise in which undeservedly severe punishment may serve desirable ends, or in which deservedly severe punishment may
yield no gain over less drastic treatment.
It is therefore necessary to provide a second-order principle to determine which of the two first-order principles will govern in areas of conflict. Such a second-order principle must be
flexible enough to permit the functioning of an actual criminal
justice system despite the occasional injustices such a system
will, as a practical matter, engender. On the other hand, the
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principle must be sufficiently rigid to preclude the types of unfair but useful practices permitted under utilitarianism.
Formulation of such a defensible second-order principle requires consideration of the concept of a "primafacie duty," a
fundamental element of the ethical system devised by W.D.
Ross:
I suggest "primafacieduty" or "conditional duty" as a brief way of
referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty
proper) which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g., the
keeping of a promise), of being an act which would be a duty proper if
it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant. Whether an act is a duty proper or actual duty depends on all
the morally significant kinds it is an instance of. . . . When I am in a

situation, as perhaps I always am, in which more than one of these
primafacie duties is incumbent on me, what I have to do is to study
the situation as fully as I can until I form the considered opinion (it is
never more) that in the circumstances one of them is more incumbent
to do this primafacie
than any other; then I am bound to think that
72
duty is my duty sansphrase in the situation.

Every time, then, that an action is of a sort prohibited by a
moral rule, I have a reason for not doing it. Every time that an
action is of a sort commended by a moral rule, I have a reason
for doing it. For example, if I am on my way to an appointment
and I see an accident occur, stopping my car in order to give
aid is an action of at least two morally significant types: it is
the breaking of a promise (my appointment), and an act of beneficence (helping the victim of the accident). In any given circumstances, I must weigh the various duties and determine
which is the strongest; this will tell me which action I have an
actual duty to perform. When I do my actual duty, then, I may
have to violate a prima facie duty or moral rule, but I cannot be
hold morally at fault since my behavior is in accordance with a
stronger prima facie duty, and it is not in my power to satisfy
both rules.
What are the implications of this view of rights and duties
with respect to the punishment of criminal defendants? The
state's prima facie obligation to protect its citizens from violations of their rights, particularly "those without which a reasonably secure and comfortable life is impossible," 73 justifies the
imposition of sanctions on individuals, because such sanctions
will have the utilitarian effect of reducing crimes. In addition to
the state's duty to protect the rights of citizens from violations
by other citizens, however, there is also a duty to protect the
72. W. Ross, supra note 54, at 19 (emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 59.
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rights of citizens from violations by the state itself.7 4 Thus the
state has a dual obligation to protect its citizens from crime and
not to punish blameless individuals.
Each of these duties, however, is a prima facie and not an
unqualified duty. When they conflict, the weaker duty must
give way to the stronger. As Ross writes,
[If] a man has respected the rights of others, there is a strong and distinctive objection to the state's inflicting any penalty on him with a
view to the good of the community or even to his own good. The interests of the society may sometimes be so deeply involved as to make it
right to punish an innocent man "that the whole nation perish not"
But then the prima facie duty of consulting the general interest has
proved more obligatory than the perfectly distinct primafacie duty of
respecting
the rights of those who have respected the rights of
75
others.

The state may, then, weigh the rights of society, or of a large
part of society, against the rights of the individual. When the
rights of the former stand to be severely violated, the state may
protect them by violating the rights of blameless individuals.76
74. The state owes no such prima facie duty to an individual who has violated the rights of others:
[The blameworthy offender], by violating the life or liberty or property
of another, has lost his own right to have his life, liberty, or property
respected, so that the state has no primafacie duty to spare him, as it
has a primafacie duty to spare the innocent. It is morally at liberty to
injure him as he has injured others, or to inflict any lesser injury on
him, or to spare him, exactly as consideration both of the good of the
community and of his own good requires.
Id. at 60-61.
75. See id. at 61.
76. D. Raphael put forth an argument that is similar to that made by Ross.
Raphael urged that when "a person is guilty of having wilfully done wrong, he
has thereby forfeited part of his claim to be treated as an end-in-himself; in acting as a non-moral being he leaves it open to his fellows to use him as such."
D. RAPHAELr, MoRAL JUDGM:NT 71 (1955). A blameworthy individual may, but
need not necessarily, be punished: "[WIhere there is an obligation to punish,
te obligation arises from utility." Id. at 70.
The state, furthermore, has an "obligation to the public at large to safeguard their security, and the corresponding claim is the claim of the public to
have their security safeguarded." Id. at 71. We may punish, and, in fact, have a
duty to punish, blameworthy individuals whose punishment will satisfy the
claim of the public to be protected. What, though, of blameless offenders?
Where there is no guilt, the infliction of pain on a particular person
may still be socially useful, but the claim of social utility is opposed by
the claim of the individual to be treated as an "end-in-himself' and not
merely as a means to the ends of society...
[However, the public still has its claim to be safeguarded and this] obligation to, or claim of, the public at large, exists of course at all times,
and if the fulfillment of it involves pain for an innocent individual it
still has its force. But the claim of the public in such circumstances
conflicts with the claim of the individual not to be pained, to be treated
as an end, and sometimes the one claim, sometimes the other, is
thought to be paramount in the circumstances. If it should be thought
necessary to override the claim of the individual for the sake of the
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Thus, the goal of protecting the rights of individuals from
criminal invasions may require, or at least be furthered by, certain violations of the rights of innocent people. Perhaps even
more frequently, the minimization of crime may be purchased
at the cost of punishing some culpable offenders more severely
than they deserve. But just as society makes a "promise" to
the innocent that they will not be punished at all,vv it makes a
promise to the guilty that they will be punished no more than
they deserve-society, in other words, has a prima facie duty to
respect retributive limits on the amount of punishment inflicted on criminals.
In cases of conflict, which promise should be kept? What
second-order principle should be adopted? That principle, as
noted earlier, must permit the degree of violation of innocents'
rights that necessarily accompanies systems of laws and penalties.7 8 The justification for permitting such violations is that
the suffering inflicted on blameless individuals, or the undeserved increment of punishment imposed on the guilty, is significantly less severe than the overall evil that systems of
criminal justice prevent. The magnitude of the permissible difference between the harm prevented and the infliction of undeserved suffering, although difficult to delineate precisely, is
suggested by the burden of proof requirement in criminal
cases.
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is constitutionally mandated for the elements of a criminal offense. 79 This standard
strikes a balance between competing societal and individual interests.8 0 Courts have indicated that, if quantified, the
claim of society, our decision is coloured by compunction, which we ex-

press by saying that the claim of justice has to give way to that of utility.
Id. at 71-72.
77. [The law makes] a promise to the injured person and his friends,
and to society. It promises to the former, in certain cases, compensation, and always the satisfaction of knowing that the offender has not
gone scot-free, and it promises to the latter this satisfaction and the degree of protection against further offences which punishment gives. At
the same time the whole system of law is a promise to the members of

the community that if they do not commit any of the prohibited acts
they will not be punished.
W. Ross, supra note 54, at 63-64.
78.
79.

See text following note 71 supra.
See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S.

358, 364 (1970).
80. [A] society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when
there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. . . . "Due process commands
that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the
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probability of guilt associated with the reasonable doubt standard might be in the range of 95-99.9%.81 The balance between

competing societal and individual interests drawn by that strict
standard indicates our willingness to let a significant number of
guilty persons go free in order to prevent conviction of the innocent.
The relatively extreme preference afforded the right to be
free from undeserved or undeservedly severe punishment over
the need of society to protect itself from crime suggests the following second-order principle for deciding conflicts between
fairness and utility: The individual right to be treated as an
end in oneself, the right of the innocent to go free and the guilty
to suffer only proportionatepenalties,may not be infringed, except in circumstances in which it is necessary to do so to protect
othersfrom more critically significant violations of their rights.
D. PLURALISM AND COERCIVE SENTENCING
Adoption of the pluralist view of punishment and the second-order principle suggested would have significant implications for coercive sentencing practices. Those implications may
be summarized in two rules: first, it is morally impermissible
to impose a greater sentence on a defendant than that justified
by his individual culpability for the purpose of coercing cooperation by the defendant or others, except in the most compelling
cases of social need; and second, because the general end of
punishment is societal well-being, the state may impose less
than the proportionate penalty on an offender if the overall
convincing the factfinder of his guilt." [Speiser v. Ranburden of ....
dall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).] To this end, the reasonable-doubt
standard is indispensable, for it "impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue."
[Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1
FAme. L.Q. 1, 26 (Dec. 1967).]
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in applications
of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law
not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in
our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs
have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a
criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with
utmost certainty.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). See generally Underwood, The Thumb
on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasionin Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J.
1299 (1977).
81. See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 1978);
United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), affid, 414 F.2d 1262
(2d Cir. 1969).
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consequences of such leniency, including resultant guilty pleas,
testimony, or informant services, would be better than those
that would likely result from imposition of the maximum deserved sentence. It should be emphasized here that it is not a
sufficient justification of an incrementally lower sentence that
it brings about some desirable consequences. It must also be
the case that any harmful consequences of such leniency (e.g.,
decreased general deterrence) do not outweigh the good
gained. 82 The retributive principle thus serves, except in cases
of extreme necessity, as an upper limit on the penalty that may
be imposed for any purpose, including the coercion of cooperation. The utilitarian principle, on the other hand, establishes a
lower limit, below which punishment may not be reduced.
Consider, for example, a defendant who is convicted of a
crime for which the statutorily authorized penalty is zero to ten
years' imprisonment, and who possesses information that may
be useful in the prosecution of other offenders. If the defendant has committed the crime under circumstances evincing
maximum culpability, the trial court may justly impose a tenyear sentence. 83 However, if the court believes that an offer of
a two-year "discount" from that sentence is both necessary and
sufficient to induce the defendant to cooperate, and that the
benefits to be gained outweigh any adverse impact of the lesser
penalty on other goals of punishment, imposition of an eightyear sentence is justifiable. On the other hand, if the circumstances surrounding the offense suggest that the defendant is
not nearly as culpable as others who commit the same crime,
the maximum deserved penalty will be less than that legislatively permissible-for example, five years' imprisonment. In
such a case, if a given degree of leniency would induce cooperation and satisfy utilitarian requirements, a sentence of less
than five years is ethically defensible. But, except in cases of
compelling need, the court may not permissibly threaten to impose a sentence of more than five years, even if under the circumstances no lesser threat will induce this defendant to
cooperate. Such a punishment would exceed just desert and
would therefore be unethical.
Of course, the upper or lower limit of justifiable punishment in an actual case is not susceptible of accurate, uniform,
82. See text accompanying notes 163-167, 175-182 infra.
83. This presupposes a rational sentencing structure under which the maximum authorized penalty is not more severe than warranted by any individual
who commits the offense.
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or verifiable determination.8 4 The unique combination of background, beliefs, personal experience, and other circumstances
that contribute to the make-up of individual judges ensures
that moral intuitions about proportionality and predictions
about consequences of a given sentence will vary widely among
jurists. Moreover, these intuitions and predictions will even
vary widely among a particular judge's dispositions of different
defendants whose chacteristics seem, to an "outside observer,"
to be practically indistinguishable. The pluralist perspective,
and the rules it implies, however, do not demand absolute consistency or complete agreement in the actual practices of
courts. Rather, that perspective requires each judge to make
his best effort to distinguish between the good consequences of
a contemplated sentence and the fairness of that sentence, and
to remain mindful that these two considerations are not conceptually or practically identical.
The mere fact that a proposed sentence is within statutory
guidelines and otherwise useful does not alone establish its
moral justifiability. Consistent with pluralism, judges must examine a defendant's crime and relative culpability and, based
on shared cultural values without regard to other goals, determine the maximum fair sentence in the case. Judges may,
then, within the limits previously described, grant leniency
based on the belief that society's interests will thereby be best
served. They may not, however, view defendants as resources
to be utilized, without limitation, for the benefit of others. The
adoption of a pluralist perspective thus commits one, not to the
application of a rigorous formula for determining a sentence in
each case, but to a sensitive recognition of the value of even
criminal defendants as ends in themselves and not mere
means.
For ease in explication in much of the following discussion,
the terms "deserved," "fair," or "otherwise appropriate" punishment frequently may appear in such a way as to suggest
that some uniquely and readily discernible penalty is being referred to. Such an implication is not intended. The terminology is simply a shorthand reference to the complex values and
processes here described.
84. See notes 61-67 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. LEGAL LIMWITATIONS ON DIFFERENTIAL
SENTENCING

However much our federal and state constitutions incorporate natural law or morality, it is generally inadequate in a legal brief to cite Foundationsof the Metaphysics of Morals85 or
The Right and the Good86 as controlling or even persuasive precedent on the validity of a judicially imposed sentence of incarceration. Therefore, assuming that the ethical permissibility of
coercive sentencing, within the limitations described, is in fact
fairly derived from justifiable moral norms, it is necessary to
explain the relationship between those moral conclusions and
positive law.
To the extent that any examination of coercive punishment
is to have legal implications, it is necessary to examine the constitutional limitations on the threat of imposition of differential
sentences to induce guilty pleas or other forms of cooperation.
From its first inconclusive confrontation with these constitutional issues in Shelton v. United States,87 until its most recent
pronouncement in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,8s the Supreme
Court has failed to provide a clearly enunciated, conceptually
adequate, or consistently applied framework for analysis. It is
possible, however, to identify two approaches for assessing
which, if any, coercive sentences are, or should be, constitutionally permissible: (1) differential sentences that "coerce" confessions, and (2) differential sentences that "unduly burden"
constitutional rights. The following sections describe and evaluate the soundness of these approaches and the validity of the
implications for differential sentencing that have been drawn
from them.

A. DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCES THAT "COERCE" CONFESSIONS
Supreme Court analysis of differential sentencing
originated in Shelton v. United States, with J. Paul Shelton's
guilty plea to federal charges of transporting a stolen vehicle.
Shelton subsequently moved to vacate the conviction on the
ground that his plea had been induced by several promises of
the prosecution, including a commitment to recommend the
one-year sentence that he, in fact, received.8 9
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

L KANT, supra note 57.
W. Ross, supra note 54.
356 U.S. 26 (1958).
434 U.S. 357 (1978).
See Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 103-04 (5th Cir.), rev'd en
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A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit vacated the conviction.90 The majority, in an opinion by Judge Rives, found a
guilty plea to be the legal equivalent of a confession in open
court,9 1 and in so doing established one mode of analyzing the
acceptability of a plea tendered in return for a proffered recommendation of a sentencing differential: if the inducement is of
such a nature that a plea/confession resulting from it would be
inadmissible under fifth amendment standards, the guilty plea
it actually produces is invalid. Judge Rives concluded that any
prosecutorial inducement, whether or not the bargain was kept,
rendered the resulting plea/confession "involuntary" and unac92
ceptable under the fifth amendment as a matter of law.
Judge Rives did not, however, explicitly consider whether
guilty pleas and confessions must always be subject to the
same standards of validity. Confessions, often extracted in custodial surroundings without an impartial judicial officer or
members of the public present, may be significantly more susceptible to constitutional infirmities than guilty pleas entered
in open court after reflection upon information supplied by a
judge and with the advice of counsel.9 3 It is necessary, then, to
determine whether the various standards of voluntariness used
to measure the validity of confessions are applicable to the acceptance of guilty pleas induced by sentencing differentials.
1.

Tests of Voluntariness

a. Truthfulness
For many years, widespread usage equated the term "voluntary" with the terms "reliable," "trustworthy," or "truthful";
the likely untrustworthiness of a coerced confession was generbane, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd and remandedper curiam, 356 U.S. 26
(1958).
90. 242 F.2d at 113.
91. Id. at 112.
92. If a plea of guilty is made upon any understanding or agreement as
to the punishment to be recommended, it is essential, we think, that,
before accepting such plea, the district court should make certain that
the plea is in fact made voluntarily. Otherwise, the plea is subject to
impeachment as having been induced by a promise of recommended
leniency.
There is no doubt, indeed it is practically conceded, that the appellant pleaded guilty in reliance on the promise of the Assistant United
States Attorney that he would receive a sentence of only one year. The
court, before accepting the plea, did not ascertain that it was in truth
and in fact a voluntary plea not induced by such promise.
Id. at 113 (footnote omitted).
93. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1970); Miranda v. Ari-

zona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58 (1966).
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ally regarded as the sole rationale for its judicial exclusion.9 4
Although a reasonable likelihood of a confession's trustworthiness, considered apart from other evidence of guilt, is no longer
a sufficient condition of its validity, 95 it clearly remains a neces-

sary condition.
Application of this test of voluntariness should not result in
a per se rule rejecting any plea induced by sentencing differentials. A rule that any threat or promise excludes a resulting
94. Professor Chadbourn, in his revision of Wigmore's treatise on evidence, wrote:
In previous editions the thesis, supported by copious documentation, advanced as the basic reason for excluding a confession was this:
'"The principle.., upon which a confession may be excluded is that it
is, under certain conditions, testimonially untrustworthy." Accordingly, the test propounded as the fundamental criterion of admissibility
was whether "the inducement [was] such that there was any fair risk
of a false confession."
...
[I]t was concluded that(a) A confession is not excluded because of any breach of
confidence or of good faith which may thereby be involved.... (b) A confession is not excluded because of any
[A] confes(c)...
illegality in the method of obtaining it....
sion is not rejected because of any connection with the privilege againstself-incrimination.
3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822, at 330 (rev. ed. J. Chadbourn 1970) (footnote
omitted) (quoting J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 822-824, at 247, 249,252 (3d ed. 1940)
(emphasis in original)).
95. It is now axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived
of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part,
upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity
of the confession and even though there is ample evidence aside from
the confession to support the conviction. Equally clear is the defendant's constitutional right at some stage in the proceedings to object to
the use of the confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964) (citations omitted). See Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 n.9 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464
n.33 (1966).
Common usage certainly does not support the equivalence of "voluntariness" with "truthfulness," and most statutory formulations of the requirements
of an acceptable plea now recognize that voluntariness is distinguishable from
a separately identifiable and necessary condition of accuracy of the plea. For
example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
(d) Insuring that the plea is voluntary. The court shall not accept a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a
plea agreement.
(f) Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance
of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such a
plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.
FED. R. CRIML P. 11. See ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 350.4(1), at 247-43 (1975).
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plea would disregard the fundamental question of whether the
confession was untrue. The appropriate test, dictated by the
truthfulness rationale, can be stated as follows: Given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession, including any inducements proffered by the state, and without regard
to independent proof of guilt, is there any substantial risk that
the confession is untrustworthy? In the typical plea-bargaining
situation, the question will thus be: Was the sentencing differential promised in return for a guilty plea so great that, under
all the circumstances, there was a substantial risk that an innocent defendant might be induced to confess falsely?
Application of that test does not suggest that, as a general
matter, guilty pleas, whether entered in hopes of leniency or to
avoid enhancement of punishment, are constitutionally infirm.
Although a sufficiently great difference in proposed sentences
might induce a false plea, the likelihood that either promised
leniency or enhancement of sentence would result in self-incrimination of the innocent is not sufficiently great to warrant a
per se ban on plea bargaining.9 6 Individualized judicial assessments of the circumstances surrounding particular pleas provide workable and adequate assurance that only those in fact
guilty are convicted on their own pleas.
b.

Informed Choice and Opportunity for Reasoned
Deliberation

Judge Tuttle, in his dissent to the three-judge panel dgcision of the Fifth Circuit in Shelton,97 argued that the appropriate test of voluntariness for guilty pleas, supported by both
precedent 98 and administrative necessity,99 was one requiring
an informed choice 1 00 between alternatives not "tainted by any
96. Cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (court's examination
of guilty plea and presence of defense counsel are generally adequate insurance of voluntary pleas).
97. 242 F.2d at 113.
98. See cases cited in 242 F.2d at 114 & nn.l-11.
99. Judge Tuttle was disturbed by the prospect that the majority decision
of the three-judge panel, if not overturned, "would considerably impede the administration of justice" by rendering prosecutors unable to offer sufficient "inducements for any person to plead guilty." 242 F.2d at 115. Conceding that a
prosecutorial promise might induce a guilty plea, he refused to accept that such
a promise necessarily compromised the plea's voluntariness. Id.
100. The choice must also be a conscious one. A confession is not considered voluntary unless it is the product of the conscious choice of the defendant-that is, a manifestation of his will. See ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 2-01, at
24 (Tent. Draft 1962). This condition of conscious volition is clearly satisfied by
pleas entered because of promised sentencing differentials, whether those dif-
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intentional or unintentional overreaching"10 by the state.
Thus, in addition to the requirements that a plea be both testimonially trustworthy and the product of a conscious act of
will,102 Judge Tuttle concluded that the waiver of fifth and sixth
amendment rights must be knowingly made.
In some circumstances, the requirement of an informed
waiver is related to the search for accuracy in conviction; if a
defendant is misinformed about the elements of the offense to
which he is confessing, he may, in fact, be innocent of that
crime. The relationship of "knowing" to "accurate," however, is
not invariable. The fact about which the accused may be misinformed may have no bearing on the nature of the crime
charged, but rather on the scope of the possible penalty or the
extent of the rights that he is being induced to give up by
pleading guilty. In such contexts, the knowing waiver requirement is properly viewed as an element of fundamental fairness;
it is simply unfair to bargain with an individual who is acting
under a material misapprehension. This same fairness consideration is also manifested in the requirement that the defendant have an opportunity for reasoned deliberation. A
confession is not valid if it is made in circumstances that substantially curtail the defendant's ability to carefully and critically identify and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of
waiving his constitutional rights.103
The requirements of informed choice and an opportunity
for reasoned deliberation are both satisfied in the typical plea
bargain. A defendant, informed by both prosecutor and court
of the unpleasant but true available choices and aided by counferentials represent morally permissible leniency or impermissible enhancement of the otherwise deserved penalty.
101. 242 F.2d at 115.
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him
by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment),
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no
proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).
Id.
102. See note 100 supra.
103. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). An element of the
same unfairness perceived in contract law between a competent party and an
infant, mental defective, or other incompetent individual permeates the quid
pro quo arrangement for a confession when the inducement is offered under
circumstances sufficiently coercive to prompt an impulsive or improvident response to an apparent but unreal advantage.
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sel in assessing their relative merits and implications, chooses
to forgo trial after ample opportunity for reasoned deliberation.
c.

Absence of Governmental Misconduct

Supreme Court decisions of the past thirty years clearly indicate that a confession, even if accurate, will be considered involuntary and thus inadmissible if it is induced under
04
circumstances evincing governmental misconduct.1 Although
physical or psychological torture or abuse will clearly vitiate a
confession, less abhorrent forms of impropriety will also suffice,
including misrepresentations, unfulfilled or unfulfillable
promises, or promises that are illegal or otherwise recognized

as improper.10S
It is with this requirement, that governmental conduct inducing a confession or plea be fair and morally acceptable, that
constitutional doctrine begins to accommodate moral limitations on coercive sentencing. If a plea induced by fundamentally unfair or unethical conduct or promises is constitutionally
104. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
[I]n cases involving involuntary confessions, this Court enforces the
strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are
sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing
a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will.
This insistence upon putting the government to the task of proving
guilt by means other than inquisition was engendered by historical
abuses which are quite familiar.
But neither the likelihood that the confession is untrue nor the
preservation of the individual's freedom of will is the sole interest at
stake. As we said just last Term, 'The abhorrence of society to the use
of involuntary confessions . . . also turns on the deep-rooted feeling
that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the
end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual
criminals themselves." Thus a complex of values underlies the stricture against use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand, this Court terms involuntary, and the role played by
each in any situation varies according to the particular circumstances
of the case.
Id. at 206-07 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1958)) (citations
omitted).
105. See cases cited in Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 114 nn.2-11
(5th Cir. 1957). Such conduct is neither logically nor invariably causally related
to inaccuracy of the resulting plea. That a plea followed physical abuse or harassment, or a monetary bribe, may, under the totality of the circumstances,
suggest that the plea was not truthful, but that conclusion is far from compelled. Furthermore, whether or not the prosecutor knows or intends that the
inducing promise will not be kept is irrelevant to the truthfulness of a confession that is motivated by a belief in the prosecutor's sincerity. The plea is not
invalid because of the likely effect on the defendant of an inducement of that
nature; it is the illegal or immoral character of the inducement itself that is
controlling, regardless of consequences.
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infirm, then a plea resulting from threats of disproportionately

severe punishment upon conviction after trial is also invalid,
and the actual imposition of such sentences is impermissible.
Application of the moral scheme earlier defended, and the perspective on punishment it implies, makes clear that while a defendant does indeed forfeit by his criminality his prima facie
right not to be treated as a means to society's ends, that forfeiture is by no means absolute; the state may permissibly "use"
him only to the extent that he has "used" others by violating
their correlative rights. When the deserved, just, or fair penalty
is exceeded, the incremental punishment represents as fundamental a violation of that defendant's rights as a person as
would conviction and punishment of the innocent. It is as unfair, as great a violation of due process, to treat a guilty defendant in this way, however laudable the ends to be served, as it
would be to punish an innocent scapegoat.
If societal ethical values are at all cognizable as constitutional limitations on state conduct in the pursuit of overall social well-being, then enhancement of the maximum
proportionate sentence to coerce cooperation is impermissible.
On the other hand, since leniency granted in return for a benefit conferred by the defendant on the state may, as demonstrated earlier, conform to acceptable moral principles, 106 plea
negotiations involving such concessions are not violative of due
process.
Evaluation of plea bargaining in accordance with fifth
amendment principles governing the admissibility of confessions thus indicates that the moral limits on coercive sentencing previously derived are supported by established
constitutional doctrines. The Supreme Court's assessment of
the constitutionality of sentencing differentials has not, however, been limited to an analysis of guilty pleas as confessions.
The sentence disparities between those who plead guilty and
those who insist on trial has also been subject to judicial scrutiny as a burden on the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
B.

DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCES THAT UNDULY BURDEN
CONSTrTUTIONAL RiGHTs

Following the three-judge panel decision in Shelton, the
case was reversed en banc, and Judge Tuttle's original dissent106. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
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ing opinion became the majority position. 07 The majority of
the full court thus adopted his proposed informed-choice test of
voluntariness and its toleration of commitments by the prosecutor to induce guilty pleas. 0 8 When the case reached the
Supreme Court, the Solicitor General confessed error on the
ground that "the plea of guilty may have been improperly obtained,"109 and the Court reversed the en bane decision of the
Court of Appeals, in a memorandum opinion. The decision did
not specify why or in what way the guilty plea might have been
"improperly obtained," however, and therefore did not necessarily overrule the reasoning of the en bane decision below." 0
The ultimate disposition of the case was thus reached without
an authoritative pronouncement on which, if any, of these potential criteria of Voluntariness are constitutionally mandated.
Not until United States v. Jackson,"' decided ten years after
Shelton, did the Supreme Court expressly analyze the constitutional significance of sentencing differentials imposed as a result of defendants' insistence on fifth and sixth amendment
rights.
Jackson involved a constitutional challenge of a provision
of the Federal Kidnapping Act that authorized the death penalty for a defendant convicted by a jury, but set forth no procedure for imposing the death penalty on a defendant who
waived the right to a jury trial or who pleaded guilty." 2 In determining "whether the Constitution permits the establishment
of such a death penalty, applicable only to those defendants
3
who assert the right to contest their guilt before a jury,"" Justice Stewart's majority opinion first considered the subjective
107. Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd and remanded per curiam, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
108. 246 F.2d at 572 n.2.
109. Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26, 26 (1958) (per curiam).
110. The Fifth Circuit apparently did not believe that the Supreme Court
overruled the reasoning of the en bane decision, and continued to apply Judge
Tutle's test of voluntariness. See, e.g., Cooper v. Holman, 356 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 855 (1966); Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966);
Martin v. United States, 256 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 921 (1958).
111. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
112. At the time of Jackson, the Federal Kidnapping Act providedWhoever knowingly transports in interstate... commerce, any person
who has been unlawfully... kidnapped... and held for ransom...
or otherwise... shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury
shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or
for life, if the death penalty is not imposed. •
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1201(a), 62 Stat. 760 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a) (1976)).
113. 390 U.S. at 581.
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impact of the potential sentencing differential on a defendant's
volition. As an empirical matter, the Court assumed that the
inevitable effect of the provision was "to discourage assertion
of the fifth amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the sixth amendment right to demand a jury trial.""14
Justice Stewart denied, however, that such "discouragement"
and "deterrence" were necessarily sufficient to render resultant
guilty pleas invalid. "Encouragement" was not, he held, necessarily equivalent to impermissible "compulsion."11 Although
the "encouragement" of the waiver of rights did not necessarily
make a plea "involuntary," the absence of "coercion" did not
necessarily insulate that plea from successful constitutional attack.
The Jackson Court divided statutory provisions that "encouraged" without necessarily compelling pleas into three
classes with respect to their constitutional validity: (1) "[i]f
the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose
to exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional"116 (2) if the purpose of the statutory scheme was to
serve a valid governmental interest, and if the resultant impact
on implicated rights was necessary and not excessive, the provision would be constitutional;"l7 and (3) if the provision unnecessarily or excessively encouraged the waiver of rights, it
would be unconstitutional.l" 8
The Government argued in Jackson that imposing the
death penalty only after a jury trial and the jury's recommendation served a valid governmental interest by avoiding the
more drastic alternative of mandatory capital punishment in
every case. Although the Court acknowledged the desirability
of mitigating the severity of punishment, it found that the
means employed by the Act resulted in an "unnecessary and
therefore excessive" chill on constitutional rights.119
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

583 & n.25.
581.
582.
583.

119. The question is not whether the chilling effect is "incidental"
rather than intentional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive. In this case the answer to the question is
clear. The Congress can of course mitigate the severity of capital punishment. The goal of limiting the death penalty to cases in which a jury
recommends it is an entirely legitimate one. But that goal can be
achieved without penalizing those defendants who plead not guilty and
demand jury trial. In some States, for example, the choice between life
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Although Jackson dealt directly only with the constitutionality of a death sentence imposed pursuant to statute, and not
with the validity of a plea induced by the threat of such a sentence, its potential implications with respect to plea bargaining
as a general practice were clear. Jackson and several criminal
procedure decisions120 had found unjustifiable actions that
made the exercise of a constitutional right so burdensome that
an individual would hesitate to assert the right. A system of
plea bargaining has similar effects. The chance of obtaining a
reduced sentence after a guilty plea (and the concomitant prospect of a heavier sentence if convicted after a trial) makes accused criminals hesitant to assert their constitutional rights to
plead not guilty and to have a jury trial. Thus, the practice of
2
plea bargaining, it might appear, is unconstitutional.' '
Whatever doubts Jackson cast on the constitutionality of
plea bargaining were soon dispelled in Brady v. United
States122 and Parkerv. North Carolina.23 In the first of these
cases, Robert Brady and a codefendant were accused of violating the section of the Federal Kidnapping Act that Jackson
subsequently invalidated. After Brady had pleaded not guilty,
he discovered that his codefendant would testify against him at
trial. Brady then changed his plea to guilty, thereby reducing
his potential maximum sentence from death to life imprisonment. 12 4 In the second case, Charles Parker was arrested and
questioned in connection with a burglary and rape. After long
interrogation he confessed. By pleading guilty, Parker avoided
the possibility of conviction for first-degree burglary, a capital
crime, and was assured a mandatory sentence of life imprison25
ment.1
imprisonment and capital punishment is left to a jury in every caseregardless of how the defendant's guilt has been determined. Given
the availability of this and other alternatives, it is clear that the selective death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act cannot be
justified by its ostensible purpose. Whatever the power of Congress to
impose a death penalty for violation of the [Act], Congress cannot impose such a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right.
Id. at 582-83 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
120. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 614 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1964). See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining,83 HARv. L. REV. 1387 (1970); Comment,
Another Look at UnconstitutionalConditions,117 U. PA. L REv. 144 (1968).
121. See Note, supra note 120, at 1407.
122. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
123. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
124. 397 U.S. at 743.
125. 397 U.S. at 791-93.
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Following the decision in Jackson, both men collaterally attacked their convictions. Each asserted that his plea was involuntary because it was a product of an unconstitutional
statutory scheme. The majority of the Court affirmed the lower
court decisions denying relief in both cases. By holding that a
differential sentencing scheme so extreme as to involve a defendant in a potential choice between life and death did not run
afoul of any test of voluntariness thus far identified,126 the
Court a fortiori affixed its imprimatur on plea bargaining generally. The majority opinion reasoned that since the motivation
behind Brady's guilty plea-the availability of his codefendant's incriminating testimony-was independent of the statute,
the statutory scheme was not causally related to the voluntari27
ness, however defined, of Brady's waiver of his rights.1
The soundness of that finding is questionable as a matter
of simple psychology. It is difficult to imagine that a defendant's decision to plead guilty will be affected by the likelihood
of conviction, but not by the consequences of that conviction
compared to the consequences of a guilty plea. But even assuming that Brady had pleaded guilty in order to avoid the possibility of the death sentence, as was unquestionably true in
Parker,the Court concluded that his plea was not involuntary
for that reason.
The Court simply noted that Jackson did not hold that all
encouraged guilty pleas are invalid, whether involuntary or
not. 2 8 The Court did not explicitly consider the requirement in
Jackson that the encouragement of the plea, or conversely, the
burden on assertion of constitutional rights, not be unnecessary or overly great. Nor did Brady and Parker deal with earlier decisions such as Malloy v. Hogan,129 Griffin v.
3 0 and Garrity v. New Jersey,131 in which the Court
California,1
126.

The Court concluded that the plea was a product of the defendant's

conscious choice. 397 U.S. at 750 (there had been no "actual or threatened
physical harm or ... mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant").
Furthermore, the Court did not doubt the plea's truthfulness. Id. at 758 ("Although Brady's plea of guilty may well have been motivated in part by a desire
to avoid a possible death penalty, we are convinced that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently made and we have no reason to doubt that his solemn admission of guilt was truthful."). Finally, the Court concluded that the
requirements of informed choice and an opportunity for reasoned deliberation
were met as long as the defendant was adequately represented by counsel Id.
at 754.
127. Id. at 749-50.
128. Id. at 747.
129. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
130. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
131. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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prohibited conditioning receipt of a benefit (or avoidance of a
burden) on forfeiture of the constitutional protection against
self-incrimination. The pressures that the defendants faced in
those cases were not more severe than those in the typical
plea-bargaining case, and were almost certainly less severe
than those confronting Brady and Parker.
The Court, however, suggested two practical goals of plea
bargaining that would distinguish the practice from earlier selfincrimination holdings and arguably justify the burden on
constitutional rights: first, administrative efficiency-the rapid
and less costly processing of defendants through the criminal
justice system;132 and second, the effective rehabilitation of
malefactors--"a defendant.., who demonstrates by his plea
that he is ready and willing to admit his crime ...

enter[s] the

correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for
success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than
might otherwise be necessary." 3 3 The Court did not, as to either justification, explicitly consider the critical moral difference between leniency in return for a plea and enhancement of
sentence in retaliation for the assertion of trial-related rights.
Certainly administrative efficiency is served by both leniency
and enhancement; both serve to coerce the guilty pleas that
grease the cogs of the judicial machine. Nonetheless, the Court
left open in a footnote the possibility that such enhancement
might be impermissible:
We here make no reference to the situation where the prosecutor
or judge, or both, deliberately employ their charging and sentencing
powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty. In
Brady's case there is no claim that the prosecutor threatened prosecution on a charge not justified by the evidence or that the trial judge
if convicted after trial in orthreatened Brady with a harsher sentence
134
der to induce him to plead guilty.

Also conspicuously absent from the Court's discussion was
any mention of its decision in North Carolinav. Pearce, 35 decided the previous year. Pearce,and its companion case, Simpson v. Rice,136 involved respondents who had been convicted of
a crime and sentenced to a prison term. Several years later,
the original convictions of each were set aside for constitutional
error, and on retrial, each respondent was convicted and resentenced. In one case, the sentence imposed, when added to the
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

397 U.S. at 752.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 751 n.8.
395 U.S. 711 (1969).
See id. at 711 n.*.
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time already served, amounted to a longer total sentence than
that originally imposed; in the other, the defendant received a
longer sentence with no credit given for time already served.
In neither case was any justification given for imposition of the
longer sentence. The Supreme Court held that the fifth and
fourteenth amendments prohibit enhanced punishment imposed as a penalty on those asserting their constitutional
rights.l37
The Brady Court made no effort to explain why a longer
prison sentence imposed as the result of assertion of rights of
appeal violated due process, while longer prison sentences, or
even death, imposed for assertion of trial rights did not. Was
there no arguable end of administrative efficiency served in
Pearce by discouraging appeals? Ifinsistence on trial indicates
lack of contrition, are not those who insist on appealing convictions for crimes of which they are subsequently found guilty
equally unlikely candidates for rehabilitation, and therefore
properly subjected to longer prison sentences? These fundamental questions went unanswered, and unasked, until the
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on plea bargain38
ing-Bordenkircherv. Hayes.

C. RECENT CASES: BORDENKIRCHER V. HAYES AND CoRBT V.
NEW JERSEY

Paul Lewis Hayes was indicted by a grand jury on a charge
of uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30, an offense punishable by a term of two to ten years in prison. After
arraignment, and during conferences with Hayes and his attorney, the prosecutor offered to recommend a prison sentence of
five years in return for a guilty plea to the indictment. He also
warned that if Hayes did not plead guilty and "save the court
the inconvenience and necessity of a trial,"139 he would seek a
new indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act,140
137. Id. at 724-25.
Due process of law... requires that vindictiveness against a de-

fendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play
no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear
of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due
process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of
such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.
Id. at 725.
138. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
139. Id. at 358.
140. Ky. REv. STAT. § 431.190 (repealed 1974) (current version at § 532.080
(Supp. 1976)).
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which would expose Hayes to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment by virtue of his two prior felony convictions. Hayes
rejected the proffered bargain, and the prosecutor obtained the
threatened Habitual Criminal indictment.
Hayes was subsequently found guilty on the forgery charge
and, following a determination that he had been twice before
convicted of felonies, was sentenced to a life term in prison.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected constitutional challenges to the enhanced sentence. In its subsequent denial of
Hayes' petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, the United
States District Court agreed that there was no constitutional infirmity in the sentence or indictment procedure.141
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the
District Court's judgment.142 Although recognizing "that plea
bargaining now plays an important role in our criminal justice
system,"' 43 the appellate court found that the prosecutor's conduct violated the due process requirements of North Carolinav.
45
Pearce' 44 and its progeny, Blackledge v. Perry,1
which extended the rule of Pearce to protect defendants from the vindictive exercise of a prosecutor's discretion.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
Sixth Circuit's judgment. The Court agreed with the proposition that "[t]o punish a person because he has done what the
law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the
most basic sort, and for an agent of the state to pursue a course
of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on
his legal rights is 'patently unconstitutional.' "146 The Court,
however, attempted to distinguish the "punitive" context of
Pearce and Perry from the assertedly "arms-length bartering"
of plea negotiations, stating that "[iin the 'give-and-take' of
plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the
prosecution's offer."147 The Court contrasted the permissible
negotiations involved in Bordenkircher with the impermissible
situation "where the prosecutor, without notice brought an additional and more serious charge after plea negotiations relat141. 434 U.S. at 360 (citing Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 45 (1976)).
142. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nora.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
143. 547 F.2d at 43.
144. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
145. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).

146. 434 U.S. at 363.
147.

Id.
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ing only to the original indictment had ended with the
defendant's insistence on pleading not guilty."1 48
The precise nature of the distinction that the Court recognizes between Pearce and Perry, on the one hand, and
Bordenkircher,on the other, is not clearly discernible in either
the language or reasoning of the opinion. One possible distinction is suggested by the emphasis placed on both the timing of
the prosecutorial decision to reindict, and the difference between "retaliation for" the defendant's exercise of rights and

"deterrence of" the exercise of those same rights. If the prosecutor's motivation for subjecting a defendant who fails to plead
guilty to potentially more severe punishment is "backwardlooking"-that is, vengeance, retribution, or mere pique at the
defendant's action-the procedure is impermissible; if, on the
other hand, the motive is "forward-looking," and designed to

obtain a bargained-for benefit for the state, it is valid, even
148.

Id. at 360.

In [Pearceand Perry] the Court was dealing with the State's unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who had chosen to exercise a legal right to attack his original conviction-a situation "very
different from the give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining
between the prosecution and the defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power." [Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790,
809 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).] The Court has emphasized that
the due process violation in cases such as Pearce and Perry lay not in
the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of
a legal right, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction.
Plea bargaining flows from "the mutuality of advantage" to defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for wanting to avoid
trial. [Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).] Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to
prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation. Indeed, common acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea
bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea
is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process. By hypothesis, the plea may have been
induced by promises of a recommendation of a lenient sentence or a
reduction of charges, and thus by fear of the possibility of a greater
penalty upon conviction after a trial.
While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a "discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an
inevitable"--and permissible---"attribute of any legitimate system
which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas." [Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1977).] It follows that, by tolerating and
encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to
forgo his right to plead not guilty.
Id. at 362-64 (citations omitted).
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though the greater sentence ultimately meted out amounts to a
cost imposed on the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
The state may, under such a view, threaten sentencing differentials as part of an overt negotiating practice explicitly
designed to deter the exercise of a legal right. The state may,
in fact, impose higher sentences on those who reject a quid pro
quo and continue to insist on the exercise of that right if the
motivation is "general deterrence"-that is, warning future defendants that exercise of the right will in fact be costly. The
state may not, however, impose incrementally greater
sentences solely to punish the exercise of legal rights with no
view toward chilling their future exercise by others and
thereby furthering the ends arguably served by plea bargaining.
A sound distinction between the permissible sentencing
differential based on the exercise of trial rights in
Bordenkircher, and the impermissible differentials based on
the exercise of rights of appeal in Pearce and Perry cannot,
however, be based on the fact that in the latter cases the
prosecutorial or judicial motivation was, or at least appeared to
be, purely retaliatory. If motivation is viewed as the critical element, it would be permissible for a trial court to announce explicitly, or follow implicitly, a policy of sentencing more
severely those defendants who indicate an intention to appeal
their convictions, on the ground that the motivation for the
practice is not to punish the assertion of the right, but rather to
conserve appellate judicial resources by deterring its exercise.
Because it is difficult to conceive of even the Bordenkircher majority countenancing such a practice, the motivation of the trial
court cannot be the sole determinant of the validity of differential sentencing.
A much more defensible distinction between sentencing
differentials following appeal and those involved in plea bargaining may be grounded in the ethical limitations on punishment proposed earlier. 4 9 That scheme prohibited the
enhancement of the just, fair, or proportionate sentence in any
case merely to serve utility, but permitted leniency or "discounts" from the maximum appropriate sentence if such treatment was conducive to desirable social ends. The distinction
between "punitive" differentials such as those in Pearce and
Perry, and "negotiated-for" differentials given in exchange for
149.

See pp. 694-98 supra.
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guilty pleas is that the former involve, or appear to involve, enhancement of appropriate penalties, while the latter often involve only permissible leniency.
When a given defendant has been sentenced for a particular offense, the state has, through its judicial officer, expressed
its view of the appropriate penalty. An enhancement of that
sentence following appeal and reconviction, in the absence of
newly discovered and penologically significant information
about the crime or criminal, suggests that the court is attempting to deter exercise of the right of appeal. In the typical pleabargaining situation, on the other hand, there is no affirmative
official indication that the charges initially filed or the indictment originally brought will result in a more severe disposition
of the case than the prosecutor, in the sound exercise of his
discretion, believes appropriate. Absent such an affirmative
showing, courts are extremely reluctant to scrutinize the reasonableness of the prosecutor's charging decision, and will generally defer to his judgment of appropriate charge and
concessions. 50
Although this distinction, if factually accurate, would accord with ethical norms, it is difficult to find support in
Bordenkircher. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Powell argued
forcefully that the prosecutor's proffered inducement to plead
guilty did not consist of an offered "discount" from the otherwise proportional sentence merited by Hayes' crime and background.151 Rather, Justice Powell argued, the sentence of life
imprisonment threatened and imposed was more excessive
than permissible under any practice with due regard for the
dignity of the individual and his right to be treated as an end in
himself, and not as an object of potential social utility. The
prior offenses that brought Hayes within the literal terms of the
Habitual Criminal Act did not themselves result in any actual
term of imprisonment. 52 Nevertheless, the addition of a conviction on a charge involving no personal injury, and property
interests of only $88.30, resulted in a sentence of life imprisonment. As Justice Powell noted, "Persons convicted of rape and
150. Although defendants may believe that their insistence on trial will result in an impermissible penalty, rather than withheld leniency, they will have
no firm evidence on which to base such a conclusion.
151. 434 U.S. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting).
152. At the age of seventeen, Hayes was charged with rape but was permitted to plead guilty to the lesser included offense of detaining a female and was
sentenced to a nonprison reformatory for five years. Subsequently, Hayes was
convicted of robbery and received probation and a five-year suspended sentence. Id. at 362-64.
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murder often are not punished so severely."' 5 3
That the sentence ultimately imposed was unjustifiable
under any formula for balancing the public interest against justice to individuals was, Justice Powell argued, demonstrated by
the prosecutor's own actions:
It seems to me that the question to be asked under the circumstances is whether the prosecutor reasonably might have charged respondent under the Habitual Criminal Act in the first place. The
deference that courts properly accord the exercise of a prosecutor's
discretion perhaps would foreclose judicial criticism if the prosecutor
originally had sought an indictment under that Act, as unreasonable as
it would have seemed. But here the prosecutor evidently made a reasonable, responsible judgment not to subject an individual to a
mandatory life sentence when his only new offense had societal implications as limited as those accompanying the uttering of a single $88
forged check and when the circumstances of his prior convictions confirmed the inappropriateness of applying the habitual criminal statute.
I think it may be inferred that the prosecutor himself deemed it unreasonable and not in the public interest
to put this defendant in jeopardy
154
of a sentence of life imprisonment.

In Bordenkircher,as in Pearce and Perry, official action indicated that an enhanced penalty was being imposed for the
exercise of a right. The majority in Bordenkircher did not expressly acknowledge or consider the force of this argument, as
would seem to be required if the enhancement/leniency dichotomy lay at the heart of their reasoning. If indeed the Court
does not reject Justice Powell's conclusions, then the majority
opinion goes distressingly far toward sanctioning the use of unfair and ethically impermissible means to legitimate ends. The
Court's subsequent decision in Corbitt v. New Jersey 5 5 does,
however, suggest a less extreme reading of Bordenkircher.
Corbitt involved a constitutional challenge to New Jersey's
homicide statute, which provides for mandatory life imprisonment for a defendant convicted of first-degree murder by a jury,
but permits the imposition of a lesser sentence if the defendant
pleads non vult or nolo contendere. 5 6 Corbitt, after pleading
not guilty to a murder indictment, was convicted by a jury of
first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the appellant's
equal protection claim and his contention that the possibility of
a sentence of less than life upon the plea of non vult and the
absence of a similar possibility when found guilty by a jury of
153. Id. at 370.
154. Id. at 370-71 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
155. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
156. See id. at 214-15 n.1 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.113-1; id. §§ 2A:113-2
to -4 (repealed 1978)).
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first-degree murder was an unconstitutional burden on his
5 7
rights under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments.
In affirming the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court,
the United States Supreme Court focused on the permissibility
of affording leniency in return for waivers of rights, but implied
that enhancement for assertion of rights would not withstand
constitutional scrutiny:
[I]t is not forbidden to extend a proper degree of leniency in return for
guilty pleas. New Jersey has done no more than that.
We discern no element of retaliation or vindictiveness against Corbitt for going to trial. There is no suggestion that he was subjected to
unwarranted charges. Nor does this record indicate that he was being
punished for exercising a constitutional right. Indeed, insofar as this
record reveals, Corbitt may have tendered a plea and it was refused.
There is no doubt that those homicide defendants who are willing to
plead non vult may be treated more leniently than those who go to
trial, but withholding the possibility of leniency from the latter cannot
be equated with impermissible punishment as long as our cases sustaining plea bargaining remain undisturbed. Those cases, as we have
said, unequivocally recognize the constitutional propriety of extending
leniency in exchange for a plea of guilty and of not extending leniency
to those who have not demonstrated those attributes on which leni8
ency is based. 15

It is at least arguable, then, that in light of Corbitt,
Bordenkircher should not be read as condoning enhancement
of appropriate sentences for coercive purposes.
Although absence of enhancement is a necessary moral
precondition of a valid differential, and possibly a legal precondition as well, it is not sufficient. Before any "encouragement"
of waiver of rights by proffered leniency can be tolerated, Jackson requires that two inquiries be made: (1) whether the ends
served by the practice are sufficiently compelling to outweigh
the burden imposed on the exercise of constitutional rights,
and (2) whether the means that impose such a burden are indeed necessary to serve those ends. 5 9 Neither of these inquiries received detailed consideration in Bordenkircher, and yet
without such consideration a defensible position on the issues
in the case cannot be formulated. The following section undertakes the required evaluation.
V. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PLEA BARGAINING
In defense of its initial approval of plea bargaining, the
American Bar Association exhaustively marshalled the variety
157. State v. Corbitt, 74 N.J. 379, 378 A.2d 235 (1977).
158. Id. at 223-24 (footnotes omitted).
159. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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of justifications traditionally appealed to in the case law and
literature.160 Guilty pleas, it urged, render charge and sentence
concessions appropriate because they: (1) increase the
promptness and certainty with which correctional measures
are applied to defendants; (2) indicate the defendant's willingness to assume responsibility for his crime; (3) make it possible to select alternative correctional measures that either are
better adapted to the goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation than the disposition available upon conviction after trial on the initially charged offense, or serve to protect the
defendant from undue harm caused by the form of conviction;
(4) make public trial unnecessary under circumstances in
which such a trial would have a deleterious impact on state or
individual interests; (5) allow cooperation that may result in
the successful prosecution of other equally dangerous or more
dangerous offenders; and/or (6) aid in avoiding delay in
processing other cases through the criminal justice system.161
It is significant to note that the ABA limited its pursuit of these
goals to offers of leniency in return for a plea and thus did not
sanction enhanced sentences as a tool of plea inducement. 162
A.

ENSURING CERTAIN AND PROMPT CORRECTIONAL MEASURES

In justifying plea bargaining on the basis that "punishment
need not be as severe if it is certain and prompt in applica-

tion," 63 the ABA commentary drew on Bentham's conclusion
that punishment is most effective if it is swift and certain.164
Swift and certain punishment, the commentary continued,
"aids in the deterrence of others and in accomplishing rehabili160. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, 299-303 (1974).

161. Id. § 1.8(a), at 308.
162. The court should not impose upon a defendant any sentence in excess of that which would be justified by any of the rehabilitative, protective, deterrent or other purposes of the criminal law because the
defendant has chosen to require the prosecution to prove his guilt at
trial rather than to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
Id. § 1.8(b), at 308.
163. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 39 (1968).
164. Rule VIII-Punishment must be further increased in point of magnitude, in proportion as itfalls short in point of proximity.
The profit of a crime is commonly more certain than its punishment; or, what amounts to the same thing, appears so to the offender.
It is generally more immediate: the temptation to offend is present; the
punishment is at a distance. Hence, there are two circumstances which
weaken the effect of punishment, its uncertainty and its distance.
J. BENTHAM, Principlesof Penal Law, in 1 WORKS OF JEREumY BEusEHue 365, 401
(J. Bowring ed. 1843) (emphasis in original).
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tation of the individual defendant."165 This reliance on
Benthamite doctrine to support plea concessions is, however,
either conceptually misplaced or empirically unsupported.
Few modern writers view rehabilitation as a realistic goal.

The practical failure of the rehabilitative approach has been so
complete that there has been a near about-face in the perspective from which punishment is viewed.166 The argument that
the shortening of the period between apprehension and imposition of sentence can serve an otherwise unattainable goal flies
in the face of practical experience.
If the goal of rehabilitation is unrealistic, does the goal of
incapacitation justify plea bargaining? If a system of plea bargaining ensures that some individual defendants who would
otherwise escape conviction after trial are subjected to punishment after a plea, then the goal of incapacitation as to those defendants is enhanced. But because it is necessary to offer
similar leniency to others who would have been convicted even
after trial, the goal of incapacitating those defendants for as

long as is fair or just is disserved. Bluntly put, while some de165. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 40 (1968).
A defendant who enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may
substantially contribute to the promptness of his punishment. If a plea
of not guilty were entered, the case would have to be placed upon the
trial calendar for trial at a later date; if the docket is crowded or the
preparation is complex or essential participants are unavailable, a substantial interval of time may elapse before trial. In some cases the
mere trial of the case would itself consume a considerable period of
time. If a defendant by his plea makes avoidance of these delays possible, it is not inconsistent with the objectives of the system to grant
charge or sentence concessions.
A defendant who enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may, in
some cases, substantially contribute to the certainty of his punishment.
It has been noted that a 'common reason' why guilty pleas are sought
'is the weakness of the State's case due to factors beyond the control of
the prosecution.' An uncooperative victim or witness may make conviction unlikely. Or, the nature of the offense may be such that a guilty
verdict from a jury would be unlikely even in the face of conclusive evidence.' Because 'it is wiser to inflict some certain punishment than to
hazard the escape of an offender after an expensive trial, plea discussions in such a case by the prosecutor would be appropriate. The
granting of charge and sentence concessions would likewise be proper
in such circumstances, for the defendant who has decided to forego the
chances of acquittal (which exist to some degree in almost every case)
has thereby made a sufficient contribution to the certainty of punishment to justify some diminution in the degree of punishment.
Id. at 40-41.
166. See, e.g., A. vON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 3-4; FAIR AND CERTAIN PuNIsHm:ENT, supra note 4, at 73-75; Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers
About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22,25 (1974); Morris, THE FUTURE OF IimvPmsoNmENT. TOWARD A PUNmvE PHImOsoPY, 72 Mxc. L. REV. 1161, 1161
(1974).
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fendants who would otherwise go scot-free are incapacitated
for a time, many more are incapacitated for significantly
shorter periods than would otherwise be the case. As incarceration comes to be viewed largely as a tool for maximally protecting society from dangerous, incorrigible felons, the value of
this plea-bargaining tradeoff becomes questionable.
As to general deterrence, the ABA model is simply misconceived. The Benthamite model upon which the ABA builds
posits a potential offender rationally weighing the consequences of either committing or refraining from committing a
particular criminal act. The deterrent effect on the individual is
a function of both the likelihood that he will be caught and the
severity of the punishment that will be imposed. Plea bargaining, however, does nothing either to increase the likelihood of
apprehension of a criminal, or to lessen the likelihood of nonconviction after trial; it merely induces some defendants, after
apprehension, to forgo the possibility of acquittal.
The effect of plea bargaining on general deterrence may, in
fact, be negative. An individual contemplating crime, to the extent that he thinks about it at all, will realize that if he is
caught he can, by astute bargaining, reduce his sentence to
substantially less than that otherwise thought necessary to optimally protect society. Similarly, a defendant who has actually
been apprehended and sentenced on his guilty plea will realize
that the antecedently threatened sanction for his conduct is reserved for those foolish enough not to deal in the prosecutorial
marketplace. For those such as him, however, the price of
crime is reduced to bargain-basement rates. Is a "consumer" in
such a system likely to be more or less intimidated in the future by the threat of punishment than one who has risked and,
in fact, faced the full force of a sanction otherwise appropriate?
Perhaps recognizing that there is no empirical evidence to
support, and much impressionistic evidence to refute, the view
that leniency in return for a plea serves the traditional goals of
authorpunishment, the ABA has deleted the original provision
67
izing concessions to the defendant on these grounds.1
B.

INDICATION OF

GENUINE

REMORSE

A second proffered justification, from a penological perspective, for differential sentencing is that a guilty plea evinces
a defendant's genuine remorse and thus indicates that he is a
167. ABA

STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY

(Tent. Draft 1979).
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less serious threat to society, is more amenable to rehabilitation, and is less deserving of retributive suffering.168 To the extent that this justification relies on the discredited
rehabilitative ideal, however, it is subject to the same criticism
as the previously considered justification. Furthermore, the asserted empirical connection between the "mea culpa" of a
guilty plea on the one hand, and dangerousness or wickedness
on the other, is in large part a judicial or scholarly fiction.
Often, a glib willingness to admit guilt in return for a sentencing concession indicates the opposite of repentance, while a
failure to confess may be motivated by just the sort of shame
69
and vulnerability to censure that mark true contrition.1
C.

ALLOWING FOR FLEXIBLE SENTENCING

Because of the relatively "coarse" nature of grading and
definition in criminal codes, and the existence of legislatively
enacted maximum and minimum sentences for certain offenses, a charge that technically fits a defendant's provable actions may carry a penologically inappropriate penalty.
Charging concessions in return for guilty pleas, it is argued, al-

low for more appropriate individualized disposition of a case. 7 0
It is undoubtedly true that current sentencing structures

168. See ABA STANDApns RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, Comment to
§ 1.8(a) (ii), at 41-45 (1968).
169. See Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1969). It is
true, of course, that in some cases a guilty plea indicates genuine repentancemost often in blue-collar or white-collar crime, when an otherwise law-abiding,
perhaps model member of the community, is charged with accepting bribes or
income tax evasion. Humiliated before his family and friends and financially
ruined by the burden of legal representation, the full reality of his wrongdoing
becomes apparent, and he is not in need of incapacitation, rehabilitation, or
specific deterrence. In such a case, however, the defendant is punished for
none of these reasons, but only for general deterrence-the example of this defendant's imprisonment will presumably indicate to others the risk that they
take by engaging in similar criminal activity. The deterrent effect of such punishment is undermined by plea bargaining to the extent that leniency as to this
defendant results in a lesser punishment than the maximally deterrent legal
sentence otherwise justified.
TION OF CRUMnAL
170. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIS
JUSTICE § 1.8(a) (iii), at 308 (1974); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF

GUILTY 45-47 (1968). Aristotle presented this view of the essential and equitable need for discretion in the sentencing function:
"[A]ll law is universal. But there are some things about which it is not
possible to speak correctly in universal terms. [When] the law speaks
universally, but the case at issue happens to fall outside the universal
formula, it is correct to rectify the shortcoming, in other words, the
omission and mistake of the lawgiver due to the generality of his statement. Such a rectification corresponds to what the lawgiver himself
would have said if he were present and what he would have enacted if
he had known of [this particular case]. And this is the very nature of
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shackle judicial discretion in perhaps undesirable ways and impose unjust burdens on those convicted of certain offenses. It
is equally true that the exercise of charging discretion in return
for a guilty plea eliminates or reduces these undesirable hardships or dispositions. A demonstrable means-ends relationship, however, is not sufficient to justify a practice that
substantially burdens a defendant's rights. It must further be
shown that no less restrictive means is available to serve the
17
desired ends. 1
In fact, a less restrictive alternative is not only available,
but required by the professional ethics of the prosecutor. By
hypothesis, a defendant who receives a charging concession in
return for a plea was initially charged with a more serious offense. If the ultimate disposition following a plea and reduction
of charge is the fair, just, or appropriate result in the case, then
the higher initial charge was necessarily unfair, unjust, or inappropriate, even if premised on facts that could be proven at
trial.172 The sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion, however, requires the prosecutor to initially charge the appropriate
offense, 7 3 regardless of the defendant's likely plea.
It is true that a defendant who is initially charged with the
lower, but appropriate, offense may escape conviction at trial,
while plea bargaining would ensure his conviction. The alternative, however, subjects defendants who will not waive their
rights to conviction and punishment under a statutory provision that is, by hypothesis, unjust in its application. That is
surely an unfair and unnecessary burden on defendants. Furthermore, efforts to ameliorate the undue harshness of legislatively permitted or required penalties by means of the pleabargaining process may be ' counterproductive, serving to forethe equitable, a rectification of law where law falls short by reason of

its universality.
ARISTOTLE, NIcHoMAcHEAN ETmICS 141-42 (M. Ostwald trans. 1962) (book V, ch.
10).
171. In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of
legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
172. Such prosecutorial "overcharging" is a frequently used tactic in the
plea-bargaining "game." See Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain,82 YALE L.J.
286, 293-94 (1972).
173. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE
DEFENSE FUNCTION, §§ 3.8-3.9, at 90-98 (1971); ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.3, at 244-45 (1975).
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stall necessary reform of unreasonable grading provisions in
existing criminal codes.
D. MAKING PUBUc TRIALS UNNECESSARY
The ABA commentary also justifies sentencing concessions
on the ground that the state or crime victim's interests would
be disserved by the public trial that would otherwise be necessitated.17 4 The brevity of the ABA's treatment of this justification, however, is commensurate with its practical significance.
The number of cases in which a plea bargain serves the purpose of avoiding an undesirable public trial is small compared
to the total number of plea bargains. Accordingly, while the
ends served are by no means insignificant, this rationale is not
alone sufficient to justify the plea-bargaining system.
E.

INDUCING COOPERATION IN THE PROSECUTION OF OTHERS

Much more significant in numbers and in social impact are
sentencing concessions given in return for a defendant's testimony or information about others involved in more serious
crimes. Because these bargains involve more than confession
of individual guilt and waiver of the right to trial, they will be
considered in detail in section VI.
F.

ADmImSTRATrVE NECESSITY

Administrative necessity has unquestionably played the
most significant role in the justification of plea bargaining.
There are currently insufficient quantities of judicial and other
necessary trial resources to provide a trial in more than a small
percentage of cases.175 Previously considered reliance on notions of the increased penological effectiveness of plea bargaining thus masks in philosophical rhetoric the reality that
motivates support for the practice; without massive infusions of
funds and training, criminal justice systems in many areas
would grind to a halt.
Do the administrative needs of the criminal justice system-in reality the only social interest served by the vast ma174. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO ADMINISTRATION OF CRZIINAL JUSTICE § 1.8(a) (iv), at 308 (1974); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY
47-48 (1968) (desire to avoid public trials for rape, indecent liberties, espionage).
175. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUnTY 49-51 (1968) ("the hard
facts are that in many localities, probably including all urban centers, the
whole administration of justice would grind to a halt were not most cases dis-

posed of on a plea of guilty").
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jority of plea bargains-justify the practice? From the time of
its initial affirmative answer in 1968, the ABA has done an
about-face on this issue. In its recently revised standards, the
administrative efficiency rationale has been deleted. In rejecting this rationale for plea bargaining, the commentary
notes, "The solution for crowded criminal dockets is the availability of sufficient personnel and other resources, so that
prompt trials can be readily given to all defendants who want
them."17 6 The commentary, however, supplies no support for
the conclusion that abolition of plea bargaining and increased
allocation of resources is the uniquely appropriate or optimally
desirable solution to the problem.
One justification for that conclusion is supplied by a
mechanical application of the due process rule that mere ad.inistrativeefficiency does not justify infringement of fundamental rights.177 The scope of that rule, however, has been
substantially restricted by recent decisions.178 Furthermore,
the dichotomy between "administrative efficiency" and more
compelling state goals is, at least in this context, highly artificial. It is unrealistic to equate the costs of the institutional inquiries mandated by "irrebuttable presumption" and related
procedural due process cases with the tremendous cost in
financial and human resources of impaneling a jury pool, selecting a jury and alternates, and providing a courtroom, trial
judge, public defender, court reporters, bailiffs, clerks, witnesses, and so on. The costs of full-blown criminal trials are
not mere administrative costs. In times of scarce financial resources to fund schools, health care, and social welfare programs for the elderly and handicapped, dollars set aside for
criminal trials represent funds unavailable for other compelling
needs.
A more forceful argument against plea bargaining is its impact on the efficacy of the sentencing policies established by
legislatures and courts. Consider the situation in which a basically rational sentencing scheme has been devised by a legislature and followed by courts. In such a system, some
defendants have freed scarce resources by pleading guilty in
return for leniency-they have received a lesser sentence than
would optimize the deterrent and incapacitative goals of pun176. Id. at 17.
177.

See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 646-47 (1974);

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
178. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113-15 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 343-49 (1976).
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ishment. By hypothesis, these individuals will be incarcerated
for a shorter period than was both fair and necessary to protect
society from their criminal proclivities. Other defendants who
have pleaded guilty will serve the sentence that optimizes
those goals-that is, the sentence that is the proper function of
utility and desert. If those sentences are less than would have
been imposed after trial, however, some defendants who
choose trial will be sentenced to periods longer than they deserve. In other words, to maintain the "credibility" of the bargaining system, trial judges must sentence some defendants
who choose trial significantly more harshly than is fair or appropriate, in order to coerce the majority of defendants to forgo
trial in return for sentences no less severe than fair and useful,
but significantly less than imposed after jury conviction. Although the increased punishment in the enhancement cases
may be justified on a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis because of
increased administrative efficiency, it is nonetheless a morally
reprehensible practice under the ethical system adopted earlier. 7 9
Administrative efficiency may thus be served within morally permissible limits, if at all, only at the cost of decreased deterrence and incapacitation, and increased crime. Although it
is empirically impossible to demonstrate that the cost of improving the criminal justice system so that it can function without plea bargaining is less than the social cost of such crime, it
is important to note that the social loss occasioned by criminal
conduct is immensely greater than the mere out-of-pocket expenses. A victim's sense of abuse, helplessness, and outrage at
the deprivation of property or personal well-being by a criminal
is far greater than that which results from ordinary casualty
losses or natural illness.
From a moral perspective, then, the ABA is correct in its
belief that enhancement of sentences for those who go to trial
(as opposed to leniency afforded those who forgo trial) is unacceptable. Furthermore, when sentencing leniency in return for
guilty pleas is sufficiently great to undermine the deterrent and
incapacitative goals of the criminal sanction, administrative desirability may not be sufficiently compelling to warrant the
practice. But between the upper limit of the maximum deserved penalty, and the lower limit of the sentence that so disserves incapacitation and deterrence that it is not justified by
179.

See pp. 694-98 supra.
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administrative necessity, there is some moral "room" for differential sentencing.
The least complex illustration is furnished by cases in
which the nature of the offender and the offense is such that
neither incapacitation nor specific deterrence are required.
Typically, this will be true in white-collar crimes, when the convicted defendant poses no future threat to society and the only
legitimate end of incarceration is thus general deterrence.0
Suppose that in such a case, the maximum deserved penalty is
two years' imprisonment. A sentencing concession of, for example, six months in return for a guilty plea will save the state
substantial financial resources, the value of which may outweigh the decreased deterrence of a 1.5-year as compared to a
2-year sentence.18 '
Even in the more complex situations in which incapacitation and specific deterrence are required, the decreased incapacitation and deterrence created by slightly shorter sentences
may be outweighed by the benefits of negotiated pleas. It is
unlikely, however, that the substantial differentials now offered
in large urban areas can be justified on such grounds. Releasing dangerous felons substantially sooner than is required by
considerations of proportionality does not serve the long-term
interests of society. At a minimum, it is appropriate to place on
the proponents of the current plea-bargaining system the burden of demonstrating that such substantial differentials do in
fact produce the maximum overall good.
Whether differentials sufficiently small to satisfy the requirements delineated above offer adequate incentives to any
significant number of defendants to forgo the slight but real
chance of acquittal at trial is problematical. It is possible to
conclude only that, if such concessions expedite criminal justice, they are otherwise morally acceptable. If greater differentials are required as a practical matter to grease the cogs of the
system, the use of plea bargaining as a tool of criminal justice
180. See note 169 supra.
181. That decreased deterrence may be relatively slight or nonexistent. The
discussion has posited the existence of a uniquely useful sentence. It may well
be true, however, that any of a range of sentences, all within the upper limit of
fairness, will serve the purpose of general deterrence equally well. For example, while consistently imposed sentences of five years for a particular type of
crime may significantly increase deterrence over sentences of probation or one
year, an increase in punishment from 18 months to 20 months or even to two
years may not. Such differences may, as a practical matter, have no incremental psychological impact on potential criminals. Courts may, then, offer such leniency in return for pleas that increase administrative efficiency.
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administration must be scrapped as either unfair or, in the long
run, more harmful than helpful to total societal interests. 8 2
VL

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COERCED COOPERATION

Although prosecutors would undoubtedly prefer to present
cases against defendants on the testimony of religious leaders
and others whose credibility is not open to serious challenge,
many offenses are of such a nature that the only witnesses with
compelling knowledge of incriminating facts are accomplices in
the specific crime, or at least general criminal associates of the
defendant. 183 One method of compelling such testimony is to
grant prosecutorial immunity to the witness for his part in the
crime to which he will testify, or other crimes in which such
testimony might indirectly implicate him.184 Having offered
such immunity, the prosecutor may then call the witness
before a grand jury and, under threat of penalty for contempt
upon failure to cooperate,185 or for perjury upon making false
assertions,1 8 6 extract the desired cooperation. Alternatively,
the witness may be subpoenaed at trial, with the same sanctions operating to coerce truthful testimony.
Prosecutors, however, will prefer to gain cooperation without granting immunity when the witness' criminal activity,
whether or not more serious than that of others whose prosecution is sought, is itself too serious to go totally unpunished. In
such a case, the prosecutor may induce the witness' cooperation in return for recommendation of a lenient sentence rather
than total immunity. Prosecutors also prefer the use of sentencing inducements to contempt or perjury proceedings,
which require the full-blown protections of a separate criminal
trial. The less rigorous protections afforded the defendant during the postconviction sentencing process permit the prosecution to influence the ultimate disposition of the defendant's
case without nearly as great an expenditure of prosecutorial resources. Furthermore, the sentencing power may be used to
182.

See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMe'N ON CRmUINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND

GOALS, TAsK FORCE REPORT ON CounTs § 3.1, at 46-49 (1973) (recommending the
eventual abolition of all forms of plea bargaining).
183. This is particularly true in prosecutions of high-level drug dealers and
organized crime figures-prosecutions in which incriminating evidence may be
available only from others lower down in the criminal hierarchy. See notes 2830 supra and accompanying text.
184. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003
(1976).
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976).
186. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623 (1976).
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aid prosecutors in obtaining the service of defendants as active
police agents and informants, a form of cooperation that cannot
be directly compelled through contempt or perjury proceedings.

87

Although there has been little case law or scholarly scrutiny and no explicit examination by the Supreme Court 8 8 of ju-

dicially coerced cooperation other than through the contempt
power, there are several objections to the practice, the clearest
of which is the potential for self-incrimination by the individual
whose cooperation is sought. Fifth amendment rights may be
involved in several types of fact situations.
In one, a defendant who has pleaded innocent to particular
charges is convicted after trial. Before or at sentencing, the
trial judge seeks an acknowledgement of the defendant's guilt,
as a sign of repentance and as a signal of the potential for more
rapid rehabilitation. 89 Alternatively, the trial court may seek
firsthand testimony concerning the role played by others in the
crime, not as an aid to their prosecution, but to more accurately
determine the relative culpability of the defendant being sentenced. 9 0 In addition, the court may seek information concerning others for purposes of facilitating their prosecution.' 9 '
Although the defendant in each case already stands convicted
of the crime charged, his fifth amendment rights may be affected because of the possibility of a successful appeal. Should
a successful appeal transpire, and a retrial occur, the defendant's statements would constitute admissible confessions of
guilt in the later proceedings. 92 In addition, a defendant convicted after trial or on a plea of guilty to specific charges may
be asked to give information or testify as to acts that might implicate him in other crimes not covered by the plea or conviction. 93
187. See generally Misner & Clough, supra note 28.
188. The Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari to consider the
practice. See Roberts v. United States, 570 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir.), aO d mer., 593
F.2d 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 42 (1979).
189. See United States v. Wright, 533 F.2d 214, 216 (5th Cir. 1976); Poteet v.
Fauver, 517 F.2d 393, 394-95 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Rodriguez, 498 F.2d
302, 312-13 (5th Cir. 1974); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 266-78 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941, 945 (5th Cir. 1966).
190. See United States v. Chaidez-Castro, 430 F.2d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 1970).
191. See United States v. Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Hayward, 471 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72,
76 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 911 (1971).
192. FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (1), (3) (hearsay exceptions for former testimony
and statements against interest).
193. See Bertrand v. United States, 467 F.2d 901, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1972).
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In a second type of fact situation, the defendant may be induced to serve as a police agent or undercover informant.
Statements made by informants to police or other officials are
not privileged communications and are admissible against the
informant as confessions.194 Although the police themselves
may forgo steps to initiate the prosecution of a cooperating arrestee, they are powerless to grant formal prosecutorial immunity.195 It may be necessary, then, for a defendant-informant,
as part of his coerced cooperation, to incriminate himself with
respect to crimes for which he has not obtained formal immunity from prosecution. In each case, the refusal to cooperate
for fear of self-incrimination may be at the expense of an enhanced sentence or a lost opportunity for leniency.
The legal and moral limits on judicial efforts to coerce each
of these forms of cooperation can be expressed in four broad
propositions: (1) it is impermissible to enhance a defendant's
sentence for noncooperation or failure to confess following conviction when such cooperation or confession might subsequently incriminate the defendant for the crime for which he is
to be sentenced, or for other crimes;196 (2) it is impermissible
to enhance sentences for noncooperation, even when self-incrimination is not at issue, except when, and to the extent that,
such conduct is indicative of a character trait that, from a penological perspective, warrants greater punishment;197 (3) a court
need not grant leniency to one asserting fifth amendment rights
as his reason for noncooperation;198 (4) the practice of granting
leniency in return for possibly self-incriminating cooperation
does not constitutionally infringe the rights either of those who
cooperate or those who stand mute and do not receive consideration.199

A. ENHANCED SENTENCES AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Courts have uniformly condemned enhanced sentences re194. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw
§ 2260, at 374 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961).
195. See In re Panham, 6 Ariz. App. 191, 193, 431 P.2d 86, 88 (1967); State v.
Crow, 367 S.W.2d 601, 605 (Mo. 1963).
196. See Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393, 398 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 302, 312-13 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Vermeulen, 436
F.2d 72, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 911 (1971); Thomas v. United
States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966).
197. See DiGiovanni v. United States, 596 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Ramos, 572 F.2d 360, 361-62 (2d Cir. 1978).
198. See United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972).
199. See id.; United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 911 (1971).
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suiting from refusal to waive fifth amendment rights. 200 Al20
though these decisions are defensible on moral grounds, 1
their soundness is called into question by the Supreme Court's
decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes.202 In Bordenkircher, Justice Powell argued in dissent that the sentence imposed for failure to plead guilty was inappropriately severe, was justified by
none of the traditional goals of punishment, and served only
administrative efficiency. 203 The majority nonetheless sustained the sentence. When defendants are coerced by threats
to aid in the conviction of other, more dangerous individuals,
equally compelling social goals are served. As in
Bordenkircher,the added increment of sentence is imposed not
in retribution or as punishment,2 04 but as part of an explicit
process of give-and-take between the prosecutor and defendant. Just as the defendant is "free" to take or leave an offer of
leniency in return for a guilty plea, he can take or leave a promise of a recommended sentence in return for cooperation in the
prosecution of others. In fact, the impact of the latter form of
coercion on fifth amendment rights is arguably less objectionable than in plea bargaining, since the cooperation of the
defendant may, but will not necessarily, lead to prosecution
and conviction. In plea bargaining, the conviction is itself assured because it is the very result required by the terms of the
deal. If under Bordenkircher it is permissible, by threatening
enhanced punishment, to coerce a defendant, by threat of enhanced punishment, to convict himself on his own plea,205 why
is it not a fortiori permissible to coerce him to merely risk conviction?
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would
condone enhanced sentences that burden the assertion of fifth
amendment rights, and the practices are indeed distinguishable. The motivating force behind the decision in Bordenkircher
was the fear that the entire criminal justice system would grind
to a halt if substantial limitations were imposed on the powers
of prosecutors to deal for pleas. 206 Although the state may have
200. See United States v. Wright, 533 F.2d 214, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 302, 313 (5th Cir. 1974); Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941, 946
(5th Cir. 1966).
201. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
202. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
203. Id. at 363.
204. See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
205. See text accompanying notes 153-155 supra.
206. See 434 U.S. at 361-62.
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a significant interest in forcing a particular defendant to cooperate in the prosecution of a codefendant or other criminal, the
use of defendants as sources of information is less critical to
the overall functioning of the criminal justice system than is
the disposition of the great majority of cases by guilty plea. Because the social end served is less compelling, the burden on
rights entailed by the practice is unacceptable.

B.

OTHER LIMITATIONS ON ENHANCED SENTENCES

As a theoretical matter, a defendant's refusal to supply information to the state or testify in court is validly considered in
setting the sentence, and may justify a more severe penalty
than would otherwise be appropriate. 207 Such enhancement
does not amount to punishment for a crime of which the defendant has not been convicted. Rather, it recognizes that
courts may take into account any facts that bear on the defendant's character and the appropriate disposition of the case.2 08
In some cases, a defendant's refusal to implicate others
may indicate that he hopes, after serving his sentence, to return to the criminal organization he is protecting.209 One of the
207. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1979), petition
for cert. pending, No. 79-261; United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1139 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979); United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233,
1236 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); United States v. Hayward,
471 F.2d 388, 390-91 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 183-84
(2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Chaidez-Castro, 430 F.2d 766, 770-71 (7th Cir.
1970); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 75-77 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 911 (1971).
208. The range of information a sentencing judge may consider is very
broad. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("A sentencing judge
Highly relevant-if not
... is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt ....
essential-to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the
fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics."). In United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle, holding that a defendant may be sentenced
more severely because of the trial judge's belief that he perjured himself at
trial. Such a sentence, the Court held, was not punishment for the crime of
perjury, but recognition that one who has perjured himself is a less likely candidate for early release from prison. Id. at 53-55.
Evidence that is not admissible at trial may be considered by sentencing
courts, including- (1) convictions subsequently overturned on fourth amendment challenges, United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205, 1210-12 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976); (2) illegally seized evidence, United States v.
Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971); (3) hearsay, United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1230 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 950 (1974); (4) dismissed counts on the original indictment, United States
v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1973); (5) evidence admitted at trial as to
counts on which the defendant was acquitted, United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d
181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972).
209. It is widely acknowledged that membership in an organized crime family and other ties to professional criminal groups are material facts that do and
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collateral benefits sought by prosecutors in coercing cooperation, in addition to the information obtained, is the "neutralization" of the informant; cooperation with the prosecution
eliminates subsequent participation in crime more effectively
than do most lawfully imposed sentences. Although refusal to
cooperate may thus in some cases indicate an unwillingness to
turn away from crime and a lack of desire for rehabilitation,
most often the explanation for noncooperation is fear of reprisal against self, family, or friends, or a misplaced sense of loy21 0
alty to past associates.
When a refusal to cooperate seems to justify additional
punishment, the extent of such incremental severity must be
strictly limited and proportional to the gravity of the failure to
cooperate. In United States v. Ramos,21 1 for example, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute
heroin. Although upon his arrest Ramos gave information that
lead to the indictment of Juan Balaguer, the person for whom
he was allegedly transporting the heroin, "he subsequently refused to testify and [was] considered to be generally uncooperative. '21 2 At the time of sentencing, his counsel told the court
that Ramos feared the consequences to his family if he testified
against others. 21 3 Clearly emphasizing in colloquy Ramos' failure to cooperate, the court imposed a sentence of ten years' imprisonment plus a ten-year special parole term.2 14 The Court of
should influence a court's sentencing decisions. Criminal associations enhance
dangers to society and require a sentence predicated primarily on incapacitation and general deterrence. See United States v. Neary, 552 F.2d 1184, 1190-95
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 864 (1977.); 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976) (special and
dangerous offenders); ABA STANDARDs RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES
AND PROCEDURES 86 (1968); ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.03(2), at 109 (Tent.

Draft 1962). But see United States v. Rao, 296 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
Congress has recognized the need for a wide-ranging inquiry about a defendant's criminal associations. The Organized Crime Control Act, for example, provides: "No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the

background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976).
210. See DiGiovanni v. United States, 596 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Long, 533 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 829 (1976);
United States v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285, 1288-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 579
F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978); HearingsBefore the Senate Subcomm. on Administrative
Practiceand Procedure of the Comm. of the Judiciaryon Invasions of Privacy,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1158 (1965).

211.
212.
213.
214.

572 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id.
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Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing by a different judge. 215 The excessive
severity of the sentence in light of Ramos' culpability, not only
for his underlying offense, but for his failure to cooperate more
fully with the prosecution, is evidenced by the disposition of
the case on remand. Ramos was resentenced under provisions
of the Federal Youth Corrections Act,216 which provides for no
required minimum period of incarceration and a maximum period of imprisonment of four years before conditional re217
lease.
The disproportionality of Ramos' original sentence and the
justifiable limits of enhancement to serve coercive purposes are
also suggested by an examination of the civil and criminal contempt alternatives open to the government to obtain cooperation. If the prosecution chooses to grant an otherwise
uncooperative witness prosecutorial immunity and then institutes civil contempt proceedings for further refusal to testify,
the maximum penalty is limited to the life of the court proceeding or the term of the grand jury, including extensions, and
may not in any event exceed eighteen months. 2 18 Although
there is no federal statutory limit on the maximum sentence
that may be imposed after criminal contempt proceedings to
punish recalcitrance, 219 the Supreme Court has made it clear
that the absence of an express limitation does not render every
220
possible sentence permissible.
Appropriate limits on the exercise of the power to punish
for criminal contempt are set forth in United States v. Leyva.22 1
In that case the defendant, convicted in state court for the sale
of heroin and sentenced to serve two concurrent twelve-year
terms, was called before a federal grand jury and questioned
regarding the source of the heroin he had sold. In spite of a
215. Id. at 362. The court noted that Ramos had been only a transporter (or
"mule") of the heroin, that he had given the name of the person for whom he

was acting, and that there was no indication that his testimony was essential
for the successful prosecution of that individual. Id. at 361.
216.

18 U.S.C. § 5005-5026 (1976).

217. Id. § 5017(a), (c).

218. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976); cf. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S.
364, 371 (1966) (persons imprisoned for criminal contempt because of refusal to
answer questions before grand jury may not be held beyond cessation of grand
jury proceedings).
219. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
220. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958) ('"The 'discretion' to
punish vested in the District Courts by § 401 is not an unbridled discretion.").
See also Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966); United States v.
Leyva, 513 F.2d 774, 779 (5th Cir. 1975).
221. 513 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1975).
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grant of immunity, he refused to testify, and was subsequently
tried for criminal contempt, convicted, and sentenced to thirtyfive years' imprisonment, to run concurrently with the twelveyear state sentences imposed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that sentence to be excessive.2 22 In light of Leyva's
relative culpability and the sentences that might have been imposed for civil contempt, perjury, or obstruction, the court reduced his sentence to two years, to be served subsequent to
the state sentences. In a similar, later case involving failure to
testify before a grand jury because, in part, of fear of reprisal,
the Fifth Circuit reduced an initial sentence for criminal contempt from fifteen to two years. 223 A three-year sentence for
criminal contempt was upheld by the United States Supreme
Court only because 'the contempt [was] by any standards a
most egregious one" and was well within the sentence authorized by Congress for the underlying conduct constituting the
contempt. 224
It appears, then, that the appropriate severity of enhanced
sentences for failure to cooperate should not, in fairness, substantially exceed the authorized penalties for statutorily defined offenses covering the same recalcitrance. In addition to
considerations of fairness, limitations of enhancement to periods on the order of one or two years may be dictated by practical considerations. As Judge Lumbard noted in Ramos,
excessive penalties for noncooperation may significantly deter
guilty pleas:
Had Ramos stood mute and insisted on his right to be tried, instead of
pleading guilty, he would have been no worse off upon conviction. Indeed, from our knowledge of dispositions in such cases, he would undoubtedly have been much better off, as a ten year sentence, with ten
year special parole to follow, is unheard of in cases such as Ramos'. It
follows that if Ramos' ten year sentence after a plea were permitted to
stand, no one would plead guilty before Judge Platt or any judge who
employed similar tactics to encourage cooperation with the government. Thus, many defendants, apprehensive about sentences on pleas
of guilty, would choose to stand trial. Such a trend would lead to the
trial of more criminal cases and would seriously threaten the ability of
within the time
the district courts to try many of their criminal22cases
5
limits required by the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.

Although enhancement of penalty for failure to testify may
thus be justifiable within these ethically and pragmatically dictated limits, it is totally indefensible to use similar incentives to
222. Id. at 780.
223. United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958, 959 (5th Cir. 1977).
224. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188-89 (1958).
225. 572 F.2d at 363 (Lumbard, J., concurring) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174).
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compel defendants to undertake active undercover work. Unlike punishment for failure to testify before grand or petit juries, the law does not recognize an affirmative right of the state
to demand, under threat of penalty, service as an undercover
informant. To create such a duty by exercise of the threat of
imposing increased penalties goes beyond the bounds of the
appropriate use of the sentencing power. Nor can it be convincingly argued that failure to serve as an informant and to risk
death or serious bodily injury is in any way indicative of a character trait warranting enhanced punishment. The proportionate punishment for the underlying offense, determined without
consideration of the refusal to perform informant services, is
therefore the absolute upper limit on the penalty that may be
imposed.
C.

ACCEPTABILTY OF SENTENCING CONCESSIONS

Sentencing concessions made in return for cooperation are
both fair and useful. 22 6 The defendant who cooperates receives
a bargained-for benefit. The defendant who refuses to cooperate and receives no leniency cannot justifiably complain, since
the sentence he receives is no more severe than that warranted
by his conduct.
It has been argued, however, that a defendant whose refusal to cooperate is based on fears of self-incrimination pays
an impermissible price-a missed opportunity for leniency-for
assertion of his fifth amendment rights.227 Such an argument,
however, leads to absurd conclusions; if valid, it would be necessary either to terminate the practice of granting concessions
to any defendant, however willing he is to cooperate, or, assuming that such leniency in some cases is desirable, to grant the
226. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1979) (cooperation must be considered with all other factors); United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d
181, 183-84 (2d Cir. 1972) ("cooperation with law enforcement officials would be
entitled to consideration"; id. at 184); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72,
76-77 (2d Cir. 1970) (defendant who had refused to cooperate was sentenced "to
the maximum total term, with the caveat that future cooperation could have a
favorable impact before the federal parole board"; id. at 77), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 911 (1971).
227. See United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1976).
The appellants were put to a Hobson's choice: remain silent and
lose the opportunity to be the objects of leniency, or speak and run the
risk of additional prosecution. A price tag was thus placed on appellants' expectation of maximum consideration at the bar of justice: they
had to waive the protection afforded them by the Fifth Amendment.
This price was too high. We, therefore, cannot permit the sentences to
stand.
Id. at 685.
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same concessions to every defendant who refuses to cooperate
on fifth amendment grounds!
Courts could, of course, place prosecutors in a dilemma by
requiring them either to grant immunity to every defendant
whose cooperation is sought or to have otherwise rational sentencing schemes undermined by concessions granted to all defendants. Does the requirement of equal protection require
that the state forgo all possibility of punishing a defendant in
order to obtain cooperation that may protect society from
others? When the failure of the state to grant leniency serves a
desirable and compelling end-the apprehension and conviction of criminals-that practice violates neither due process nor
equal protection guarantees, regardless of whether refusal to
cooperate is characterized as forgoing a benefit or suffering a
burden.
VII

COERCIVE PRACTICES AND "PRESUAHPTIVE"
SENTENCING

The coercive practices thus far evaluated developed against
a background of broad judicial discretion to set sentences
within an often extreme range of legislatively permissible dispositions. The lack of statutory guidance for the sentencing
judge on the appropriateness of a particular sentence has resulted in unequal, unfair, and irrational treatment of convicted
criminals. This aspect of criminal punishment has been the
subject of increasingly severe criticism both from within and
without the legal realm,228 and has engendered a substantial
number of proposals designed to ensure uniform and principled sentencing practices.2 2 9 The single most significant legislative response to the problem, in terms of potentially
widespread impact, is contained in the proposed revision of the
Federal Criminal Code.230 While a detailed evaluation of that
and other similar state statutory provisions is beyond the scope
of this Article, it is appropriate to consider briefly the implications of this type of reform for coercive sentencing.
228. See AMERICAN FRIENDs SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A
REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 124-25 (1971); M. FRANKEL,

supra note 19, at 86-102; A. VON HRSCH, supra note 4, at 98-99.

229. See generally PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPECIAL CONFERENCE ON DETERMINATE SENTENCING, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? (1978);
L. WILKINs, J. K ESS, D. GOTrFREDSON, J. CALPIN & A. GELMAN, SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION (1978).
230.

S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 14371.
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The proposed federal reform creates, as an independent or2 31
gan of the judiciary, a United States Sentencing Commission,
whose duties include the formulation of sentencing "guidelines.

'232

Those guidelines specify classes of offenses and types

of offenders and, for each such offender and offense, a recommended disposition that ranges from probation to fine to imprisonment.233 In cases in which a period of incarceration is
indicated, the guidelines must also provide a fairly limited recommended range of sentences, the maximum of which may not
4
exceed the minimum by more than twenty-five percent. 23
In establishing categories of offenses and offenders, the
statutory language does not require the Commission to consider the form of conviction-guilty plea versus conviction after
trial-or the defendant's cooperation or lack of cooperation
with the prosecutor and police; however, the statute does permit such consideration. 235 The Commission is required to issue "general policy statements regarding application of the
guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing that ... would
further the purposes" of the Act.236 Legislative history makes it
clear that those policy statements may "address ... such ques-

tions as the appropriateness of sentences outside the guidelines where there exists a particular aggravating or mitigating
factor which did not occur sufficiently frequently to be incorporated in the guidelines themselves." 237
The types of aggravating or mitigating factors explicitly
considered in the statute itself and its legislative history are
generally limited to those bearing on the defendant's character
and the need to adjust the sentence for purposes of general or
specific deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. 238 As previously noted, pleas or other cooperation may reflect such penologically significant aspects of the defendant's character.23 9
Furthermore, although frequently they are not penologically
significant, 240 consideration of such factors in setting the sentence may serve the traditional end of punishment-the elimination of social harm through effective enforcement of the
231. Id.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. § 994.
Id.
Id.§ 994(b).
Id. § 994(c).
Id. § 944(a) (2).
S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1165 (1977).
See id. at 1167-68.
See note 169 supra; text accompanying notes 168, 207-209 supra.
See text accompanying notes 169, 210 supra.
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substantive criminal law. While the Commission is not mandated, then, to consider the issues with which this Article has
dealt, it has ample authority to do so in its formulation of
guidelines and general policy statements aimed at effectuating
the broad goals of criminal sentencing.
Although trial courts are required under the proposed statutory scheme to consider both the Commission's guidelines
and its policy statements when imposing a sentence, the disposition chosen may be outside the range established by the
Commission.2 4 1 In all cases, however, the court must "state...
the general reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence is outside the range [established by
the Commission], the reason for the imposition of a sentence
outside such range."2 42 Courts are not precluded from considering guilty pleas and cooperation by defendants in determining sentences subject to appellate review under the Act.24 3
In formulating guidelines and policy statements, or in
choosing an appropriate sentence, the Commission and courts
should adhere to the moral limitations derived earlier, offering
leniency in return for cooperation within the bounds of utilitarian considerations, and not exceeding the maximum appropriate sentence dictated by retributive proportionality, to
penalize recalcitrance and insistence on the exercise of constitutional rights.
VIIi

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

Whether a convicted defendant will be incarcerated and, if
so, for what duration, may be determined in significant part by

the trial court's evaluation of the offender's potential value as a
source of information and his willingness to become an undercover informant. Frequently courts possess little or no
firsthand knowledge of any of these factors. Such information
comes from prosecutors, police, and probation or presentence
studies that, in turn, may report secondhand or thirdhand hearsay, which is frequently gleaned from other informants.2 44
Sentencing is a critical, often the most critical, stage of
criminal proceedings. 24 5 In the great majority of cases disposed
241. S. 1437, supra note 230, § 2003 (1977).
242. Id. § 2003(b).
243. See 18 U.S.C. § 2003(a)(1) (1976).
244. The court may obtain firsthand knowledge concerning the scope of defendant's information through testimony of the defendant or other witnesses at
trial, or as part of the required testimony when accepting a guilty plea.
245. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977); Mempa v. Rhay, 389
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of by guilty plea, it is the only critical stage for. the defendant.24
Nevertheless, the sentencing process historically has
been less subject to due process scrutiny than most other postconviction stages of the criminal trial process, in which lesser
or comparable liberty interests are implicated. 2 47
This extreme dichotomy between the procedures required
in order to find a person guilty and those required in setting his
sentence initially received the imprimatur of the Supreme
Court in Williams v. New York,248 in which the Court concluded that "[t] he due process clause should not be treated as
a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in
the mold of trial procedure."2 4 9 The Court emphasized that a
"sentencing judge ... is not confined to the narrow issue of
guilt.' 250 To determine an appropriate sentence, he must possess "the fullest information possible" regarding the defendant's character and background: 25 ' "[M]odern concepts
individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to
obtain pertinent information by a requirement of -rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the
trial.,252 The Court de-emphasized considerations relating to
U.S. 128, 134 (1967); United States v. Pinkney, 551 F.2d 1241, 1249 (D.C. Cir.
1976); 8A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 32.04(1), at 32-59 (rev. ed. 1979).
246.

See 8A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

32.04(1), at 32-50 (rev. ed. 1979).

See generally Note, I Swear That 'm Guilty, So Help Me God: The Oath in Rule
11 Proceedings,46 FORDHAM L REV. 1242, 1243 n.14 (1978); Note, Rule 11 and
CollateralAttack on Guilty Pleas, 86 YALE I.J. 1395, 1395 n.1 (1977).
247. We continue to "weave the most elaborate procedures to safeguard the
rights of those who stand trial, but then treat as a casual anticlimax the perfunctory process of deciding whether, and for how long, the defendant will be
locked away or otherwise 'treated."' M. FRANEL, CRnMINAL SENTENCES: LAw
WrrHouT ORDER vii (1972). See Coffee, The Future of Sentencing Refor=m
Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualizationof Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1361
(1975); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81
HARv. I. REV. 821 (1968). See also Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.

1955).
The lack of constitutional and evidentiary safeguards thrown
around a convicted offender is in striking contrast to those surrounding
him before he is found guilty... Yet every lawyer engaged in defending criminal cases knows that often a finding of guilt is a foregone conclusion, and that the real issue centers about the severity of the
punishment.
Id. at 754 (citations omitted).
248. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
249. Id. at 251.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 247.
252. Id. Codifications of evidence rules frequently include express provisions excluding their applicability to sentencing proceedings. The Federal
Rules of Evidence, for example, provide:
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the accuracy and reliability of the information supplied to a
sentencing judge and consequently concluded that cross-examination was not critical at this stage of the criminal process. 25 3
Recently, there has been a clear drift away from the absolute no-due-process-at-sentence position some have read into
Williams.2 54 The American Bar Association, for example, has
recognized the dangers inherent in the abandonment of due
process protection in sentencing procedures: "Where the need
for further evidence has not been eliminated by a presentence
conference, evidence offered by the parties on the sentencing
issue should be presented in open court with full rights of confrontation, cross-examination and representation by counsel." 25 5 In its most recent discussion of the subject in Gardner

5 6 the Supreme Court agreed with the ABA's viewv. Florida,2
point. Although the Court limited its holding to capital sentencing procedures, it acknowledged that "it is now clear that
the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy
the requirements of the Due Process Clause."2 57 Although the
"qualitative difference between the death penalty and other
punishments calls for a greater degree of reliability when the
death sentence is imposed," 258 Williams should not, as Judge
Friendly has noted, be overread to "mean that the due process
clause [has] no application to mere sentencing." 259 ReliabilRules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do
not apply in the following situations:

(3) Miscellaneous proceedings. Proceedings for extradition or
rendition; preliminary examinations in criminal cases; sentencing, or
granting or revoking probation; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses, and search warrants; and proceedings with respect to
release on bail or otherwise.
FED.R. EVID. 1101(d) (emphasis added).
Judicially or legislatively formulated rules of evidence cannot, however,
eliminate constitutional requirements of fairness. The Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 1101(d) states that "the rule is not intended as an expression as to
when due process or other constitutional provisions may require an evidentiary
hearing." 56 F.R.D. 183, 351 (1972). See United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp.
1285, 1289 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The 1975 amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reflect an increasing awareness of the importance of reliable information as a predicate for proper sentencing.
253. 337 U.S. at 250.
254. See, e.g., Note, supra note 247, at 827-28.
255. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 5.4(b), at 254 (1968).
256. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
257. Id. at 358.
258. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
259. Holls v. Smith, 571 F.2d 685, 693 (2d Cir. 1978).
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though literally of vital importance in capital cases, is sig-

26 1
nificant in all sentencings.

If, then, the due process clause is applicable to sentencing
procedures, what are its minimum requirements? That question was recently raised and exhaustively analyzed in United
States v. Fatico,262 a compelling and well-reasoned opinion by
Judge Jack B. Weinstein, based on facts closely analogous to
coercive sentencing situations. Fatico involved two brothers
indicted in connection with a series of armed hijackings of
trucks from New York's Kennedy Airport. The defendants
were initially charged with conspiracy to receive, and with receiving, stolen goods from interstate commerce, but they ultimately entered guilty pleas to a conspiracy count in
satisfaction of all charges then pending. Prior to sentencing,
the defendants objected to suggestions in the presentence re260. Prior to 1966, the practice was not to reveal presentence reports to the
defendant or counsel In 1966, disclosure was made permissive, and in 1975, it
became mandatory. See FED. R. Cium. P. 32(c) (3) (A); 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 524, at 394 (1969 & Supp. 1978).
It is significant that Congress, expressing national policy by legislation,
added a final sentence to the Supreme Court's proposed draft of Rule
32(c) (3) (A). The addition provides that, at the discretion of the court, the defendant is to be afforded the opportunity to introduce testimony or other information relating to "any factual inaccuracy contained in the presentence
report." For a summary of the legislative history, see 8A MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 32.03[4], at 32-48 to -49 (rev. ed. 1979); id. T 32.0[5] [b], at 32-14 to -15.
The Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of
mandatory disclosure was to ensure factual accuracy. ProposedAmendments to
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedurefor the United States District Courts, 62
F.R.D. 271, 325 (1974). In explaining the rights of a defendant to contest the accuracy of the Government's contentions, the House Judiciary Committee wrote:
The Committee added language to subdivision (c) (3) (A) that permits a defendant to offer testimony or information to rebut alleged factual inaccuracies in the presentence report. Since the presentence
report is to be used by the court in imposing sentence and since the
consequence of any significantinaccuracycan be very serious to the defendant, the Committee believes that it is essential that the presentence
report be completely accurate in every material respect. The Committee's addition to subdivision (c) (3) (A) will help insure the accuracy of
the present report.
H.L REP. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975) (emphasis added).
261. It is relevant that in Gardner the Court relied upon due process rather
than eighth amendment analysis:
Instead of relying upon the reasoning of the eighth amendment as
other capital cases had, a plurality used due process analysis to invalidate nondisclosure of a presentence report ....
The due process reasoning and its concomitant balancing test allow a defendant facing a
potential prison sentence or a fine to advance liberty or property interests sufficient to require procedural protections.
Note, Gardner v. Florida: The Application of Due Process to Sentencing Procedures, 63 VA. L. REv. 1281, 1297 (1977) (footnote omitted).
262. 441 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 579 F.2d 707
(2d Cir. 1978).
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ports identifying them as members of the Gambino organized
crime family and as important figures in the upper echelon of
organized crime. At a sentencing hearing, the government offered to support its allegations with testimony by an FBI agent
who was the former head of the FBI's Organized Crime Unit in
the New York office. This proffered testimony was based on information furnished to the agent by an alleged member of the
Gambino family. The government objected to the defendant's
proposed cross-examination of the agent about matters that
might lead to the disclosure of the confidential source, contending that revelation of the informer's identity would jeopardize
26 3
his life and compromise his position as a valuable informant.
Although acknowledging that "[mlembership in an organized crime family and other ties to professional criminal
groups are material facts that would and should influence the
court's sentencing decision,"264 the trial judge concluded that
introduction of the FBI agent's testimony would violate both
the defendant's fifth amendment right of due process and his
sixth amendment right of confrontation. Although that conclusion was, on the particular facts of the case, subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,2 65 the
soundness of the district court's general reasoning remains unquestioned.
The district court first noted that although the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses is "one of the 'minimum requirements of due process' "266 necessarily afforded at
trial, it is not invariably available to defendants at postconviction stages of the criminal process. 267 The court also noted that
while the Supreme Court has extended this due process right
2
to parole revocation and probation revocation hearings,

68

it

has refused to apply the requirement to prison disciplinary proceedings. 269 Generally, the right is available if a substantial liberty interest is at stake in the proceedin.
Whether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to

which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." The
question is not merely the "weight" of the individual's interest, but
whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of
263.
264.
265.
266.
(1972)).

See 441 F. Supp. at 1288.
Id.
United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
441 F. Supp. at 1292 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489

267. 441 F. Supp. at 1292.
268. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972).
269. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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the "liberty or property" language of the fourteenth amendment.

270

The District Court in Fatico found,
The sentencing process is more like parole and probation revocation hearings than it is like prison disciplinary proceedings. Loss of
present liberty is at stake. A courtroom setting makes it relatively simple to afford minimum due process. Like the parolee, the convicted destake a liberty interest its
fendant about to be sentenced has2 7at
1
"termination inflicts a grievous loss.",

The court's conclusion that the state should produce for crossexamination those witnesses whose assertions are offered to
establish facts material to the sentencing decision was also
grounded in the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.

2 72

270. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (citations omitted). Thus,
although parole and probation revocation are not stages of a criminal prosecution, both "result in a loss of liberty." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782
(1973). "[M]inimum requirements of due process" are thus warranted, including "the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation)."
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489.
In contrast, the Court has held that a prison inmate's loss of good time
credits is qualitatively different from the revocation of parole for a parolee.
"Simply put, revocation proceedings determine whether the parolee will be
free or in prison, a matter of obvious great moment to him." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974). The loss of good time, on the other hand, "very
likely, does not then and there work any change in the conditions of his liberty.
It can postpone the date of eligibility for parole and extend the maximum term
to be served, but it is not certain to do so, for good time may be restored." Id.
at 561.
271. United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285, 1293 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd on
othergrounds, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 482 (1972)).
272. The history of the confrontation clause and the development of the
case law interpreting the clause suggest at least the following requirements:
[T]he government cannot affirmatively prevent the defendant from
examining under oath a declarant when the declarant's knowledge is
offered by the government (1) at a critical stage of the criminal process, (2) as to crucial information that (3) directly affects a substantial
liberty interest of the defendant. To deny defendant access to an informant whose declarations are introduced as evidence is to affirmatively prevent the defendant from examining him. This requirement
does not unduly burden the sentencing or other critical criminal
processes, but it does afford the defendant his constitutionally mandated protection of confrontation.
Id. at 1297. See generally Natali, Green, Dutton & Chambers, Three Cases in
Search of a Theory, 7 RTrr.-C m. L.J. 43 (1975); Younger, Confrontation and
Hearsay: A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, 1 HoFSTRA L REV. 32 (1973);
Note, Hearsayand Confrontation,32 WAsH. & LEE L REV. 243 (1975); Note, Confrontationand the HearsayRule, 75 YALE IUJ. 1434 (1966).
A declarant's statements concerning the defendant's possession of information useful to the state in the prosecution of crime and concerning the extent
and success of the defendant's efforts to cooperate satisfy these requirements
when offered at a sentencing hearing. Sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal process; the information is crucial and directly affects the substantial liberty interests of the defendant.
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The trial court's conclusion in Fatico was subsequently
limited on appeal by the Second Circuit's holding that neither
the due process clause nor the confrontation clause '"prevents
the use in sentencing of out-of-court declarations by an unidentified informant where there is good cause for the nondisclosure of his identity and there is sufficient corroboration by
other means." 273 When either of these two conditions is unsatisfied, however, a defendant must have the opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses whose assertions form, in whole or in
part, the basis for either leniency or enhancement of sentence
for coercive purposes.
In addition to this requirement, the district court in Fatico
identified six "governing principles" 274 of federal constitutional
law applicable to the coercive sentencing process. First, although sentencing judges must be permitted to consider at
least some hearsay information, it does not follow on either
constitutional or nonconstitutional grounds that sentencing
judges must be permitted to consider all hearsay information.275 Second, "[m]isinformation or misunderstanding that is
materially untrue regarding a prior criminal record, or material
false assumptions as to any facts relevant to sentencing, renders the entire sentencing procedure invalid as a violation of
due process." 276 Third, "[clourts have not limited their focus to
cases in which there was proven reliance on demonstrably
false information . . . Rather, with increasing frequency, relief
has been provided when the sentencing process created a significant possibility that misinformation infected the decision,
and prophylactic measures have been developed to guard
against that possibility."277 Fourth, once a defendant effectively
demonstrates reasonable doubt of the truth of material information, even if he cannot demonstrably show such information
to be false, it is impermissible to place the burden of refutation
on him.278 Fifth, "in some circumstances the probation office or
prosecution should be requested to provide substantiation of
273. United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted).
274. United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285, 1293-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd
on other grounds, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
275. See 441 F. Supp. at 1293 (quoting United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 120

(D.C. Cir. 1976)).
276. 441 F. Supp. at 1293 (quoting United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 816
(2d Cir. 1970)). See also United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 657 (2d Cir.
1973).
277. 441 F. Supp. at 1293-94 (quoting United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 118
(D.C. Cir. 1976)) (emphasis in Fatico).
278. 441 F. Supp. at 1294 (citing United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 120 (D.C.
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challenged information submitted to the judge."279 Finally, decisions about appropriate procedures to ensure reliable information are largely left to the discretion of the sentencing
judge.280 Although the court emphasized that "rigid adherence
to hearsay and other rules of evidence at a sentencing hearing

is not essential," and that many matters may be established in
an informal way, a sentencing judge must exercise "sound judi-

cial sense for what is essential to protect a defendant against
injustice in sentencing."281

As a practical matter, the force of the protection afforded a
defendant at sentencing by these enumerated requirements is

a function of the burden of proof that the state must meet in
establishing those facts upon which enhancement of sentence
or denial of leniency is to be based. That burden may theoreti-

cally be located at any point on the continuum between the
'"preponderance of the evidence" test of most civil suits to the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" test for establishment of the elements of a criminal offense. After a lengthy analysis of the various burdens of proof required in a host of civil and criminal
contexts, and the competing state and individual interests at
stake, the trial court in Fatico appropriately concluded that the
burden on the prosecution to establish facts not proved at trial,

but upon which critical liberty rights of the defendant will

2
hinge, is one of "clear unequivocal and convincing evidence."28

Cir. 1976); United States v. Perri,513 F.2d 572, 574 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 659 (2d Cir. 1973)).
279. 441 F. Supp. at 1294 (quoting United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 658
(2d Cir. 1973)).
280. 441 F. Supp. at 1294 (citing United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 658
(2d Cir. 1973)); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1230 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974)).
281. 441 F. Supp. at 1295..
282. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). The court
relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605
(1967), and the Second Circuit's more recent holding in Hollis v. Smith, 571 F.2d
685 (2d Cir. 1978). Specht involved a conviction for taking indecent liberties,
under a Colorado statute that specified a ten-year maximum sentence. Another
statute, the Sex Offenders Act, allowed the trial court to impose an indeterminate sentence of from one day to life if the court was "of the opinion that [a
person convicted of specified sex offenses], if at large, constitutes a threat of
bodily harm to members of the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally
ill." 386 U.S. at 607 (quoting CoLO.REv. STAT. § 39-19-1). Characterizing the invocation of the Act as "the making of a new charge leading to criminal punishment," 386 U.S. at 610, the Court held that the defendant must be afforded
substantial due process: "[The defendant must] be present with counsel, have
an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the
right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his own. And there must be
findings adequate to make meaningful any appeal that is allowed." Id.
Hollis, a case similar to Specht, involved a New York sex offender law that,
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That holding, and its supportive reasoning, apply mutatis mutandis to any fact concerning the defendant's cooperation or
lack of cooperation upon which the severity of sentence will be
based.
In order to ensure that the state proves by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence the facts upon which a differential
sentence is based, trial courts should, either as a self-initiated

practice, or in conformity with rules formulated by appellate
courts in their supervisory capacity or by legislative enactment,
state on the record their reasons for choosing a particular disposition in any given case. Such a record should include an indication of those facts as to which the court believes the state
has met its burden of proof, and the significance that those
facts played in determining the sentence imposed. 283 Indication should be given, within fairly narrow limits, of the sentence that would have been imposed were the court not
seeking to serve coercive goals, and the degree of leniency that
unlike the Colorado statute, required no proof of new fact before enhancement
of sentence. Rather, it "simply enlarged the court's sentencing discretion without any standards whatever," 571 F.2d at 688, from a maximum of five years to a
maximum of life. The statute had been interpreted by the state courts, however, to require a psychiatric study and finding that the defendant was dangerous or capable of benefiting from confinement. In Hols,the Second Circuit, in
an opinion by Judge Friendly, determined that due process required proof of
the critical fact at issue by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence." Id.
at 695-96.
283. Compare the statement of the district court judge in Fatico at sentencing.
Defendant has recently been sentenced to three years on a federal
gambling charge independent of the instant hijacking case.... He is
appealing from the conviction and the sentence has been stayed.
Were it not for the organized crime issue, defendant would have
been sentenced in the hijacking case to no more than a three year
term, concurrent with the gambling sentence. This is in conformity
with standard practice favoring concurrency. A three year concurrent
sentence would take into account defendant's age, health problems,
close and stable family relationships, and the fact that because his
prior convictions in the state courts have almost without exception
been punished by relatively small fines and probations, this is his first
major taste of incarceration. In addition, the maximum penalty is five
years and defendant is entitled to some consideration for his plea of

guilty.
Based on the evidence presented at the sentence hearing, the court
concludes that defendant is a member of the Gambino crime family. It
sentences him to a prison term of four years to be served consecutively
with the three year sentence for gambling. This new sentence is necessary for purposes of incapacitation to protect the public from further
criminal conduct by the defendant, a recidivist and member of a dangerous group of well-organized criminals.
United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 412-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (citations omitted).
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will be afforded for specified future cooperation by the defendant.
A record of the factors that influenced the sentencing decision, and their relative weights, enables a defendant to evaluate
the precise cost of continued recalcitrance and the value to be
obtained by future cooperation. A "firm offer" is more likely to
induce a change of heart in an uncooperative defendant than is
mere conjecture about the possibility and extent of leniency to
be gained for assisting the prosecution. The fact that the quid
pro quo is a matter of record protects a defendant who chooses
to cooperate from the possibility of subsequent disputes concerning the nature of the services expected of him, and the
value of the proferred "reward."
As an almost uniform matter, however, courts have traditionally not been required to state on the record any reason
whatsoever for imposition of a sentence that is within statutory
bounds.B4 Absence of such a requirement is a corollary of the
general rule that appellate courts will not substantively review
sentences imposed in conformity with guarantees of procedural
due process. 2 8 5 But just as the soundness of the latter rule is
coming under ever-increasing attack,2 8 6 so too must the justifiability of the former. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to consider the desirability of specific proposals calling for
general appellate review of sentencing; it is clear that such review would serve a number of valuable goals when coercion
plays a part in the sentencing court's philosophy.
First, given an adequate record, it will be possible for appellate courts to find as a matter of law that the state did not in
fact meet its burden of proof as to facts that the trial court considered critical elements of the sentence determination. Second, it will be possible to determine that a defendant was
denied the opportunity to cross-examine a witness whose statements were relied upon by the trial court in setting the sentence, when there was either no compelling reason to refuse to
produce the extra-judicial declarant, or insufficient corroborating information concerning the facts asserted. Third, in their
supervisory role, appellate courts may indicate that a particular
284.

See United States v. Rosner, 549 F.2d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 1977), cert de-

nied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977); United States v. Siejo, 537 F.2d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 1976),

cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1043 (1977).
285. See note 19 supra.
286. See generally ABA STANDARDS

RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF

SENTENCES 39-41 (1968); Richey, Appellate Review of Sentencing: Recommendationfor a Hybrid Approach, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71 (1978).
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differential coercively imposed was inappropriately severe, or
that enhancement, rather than leniency, was impermissibly
used by the trial court. Excessively severe sentences for coercive purposes would thus be curtailed, abuses of the sentencing
power reduced, increased fairness ensured, and development of
principled criteria for just and rational sentences fostered.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Exercise of the judicial sentencing power to coerce guilty
pleas, testimony, or informant services may be consistent with
justifiable ethical norms, constitutional requirements, and the
proper role of courts in an adversary system. But even as society seeks to protect itself from those who would prey on its
members, the exercise of that power must be rigidly circumscribed by considerations of retributive proportionality, on the
one hand, and utilitarian effectiveness, on the other, within a
procedural context designed with due regard for the fundamental rights of the accused or convicted.

